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FORUM
ILL-TREATMENT, BRUTALITY, AND TORTURE:
SOME THOUGHTS UPON THE "TREATMENT"
OF IRISH POLITICAL PRISONERS
DAVID LOWRY*
T HE RECENT abolition of civil liberties in Northern Ireland has
not gone unnoticed by the American media. Many Americans
are aware of the seemingly endless escalation of violence and
"guerrilla warfare" that has prevailed since the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Movement began a campaign of public advocacy in
1968. The reasons for the present state of affairs are usually por-
trayed as based upon historical religious antipathy and entrenched
bigotry by the institutions of government towards the Roman Catholic
minority. Most American political commentators seem to take the
the view that the current crisis is merely an insoluable political prob-
lem. Because of such lack of insight, the avowed quest of the British
and Northern Ireland governments for "law and order" prior to
reform in the area of civil rights has been generally regarded as a
desirable goal. It is submitted that the pursuit of law and order has
further exacerbated the difficulties in seeking a political solution.
What is not so readily apparent, however, is that the calculated use
of oppression against the minority in Northern Ireland has encom-
passed the diminution of civil liberties in the area that is known as
"due process." This essay seeks to examine the use of emergency
powers in the present Irish context and, in particular, the use of
detention without charge or trial and the ill-treatment of political
prisoners while so detained.
* LL.B., Queens University Belfast; LL.M., New York University; A.C.I.S.;
Barrister, Nova Scotia Bar, Canada. The author gratefully acknowledges the as-
sistance of Dr. Joel Fineberg, Professor of Philosophy, Rockefeller University, in
the compilation of material for this article.
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At the outset, I would state that my intention here is not to ap-
portion "blame" as such, but rather to examine such notions as
'detention without trial' and the 'ill-treatment' of political prisoners
in order to acquire information pertaining to subversion. Such an
examination is timely due to the recent publication of two reports on
the issue of ill-treatment that raise disturbing questions from the
standpoint of law and morality.1 Both inquiries were established by
the British government in 1971 to investigate allegations of bru-
tality and the techniques used by the security forces against persons
suspected of illegal activities and incarcerated without trial. To
assert that the reasoning contained in these reports is questionable is
an understatement, however, the justification of state repression and
violence towards its citizens cannot be divorced from th social,
political and legal conditions that exist. With this in mind, I will
briefly sketch the social context of the violence and repression in
Northern Ireland by way of introductory comments. I will then dwell,
at some length, upon the two reports on ill-treatment before analyz-
ing contemporary theories of punishment. The concluding section
of this paper will deal with the ethical problems presented when
circumstances are such that the state seeks to justify ill-treatment
and cruelty in its treatment of prisoners.
INTRODUCTION
All reasonable men would agree that it is tragic to witness police-
men, soldiers and civilians dying in the slums of Belfast and London-
derry, but it is no less shocking that human beings should have to
live -in those slums. It is surely not surprising that people who
exist in conditions of abject poverty eventually take to the streets in
protest. It may be asserted that the conditions that existed in 1968
in Northern Ireland constitute the classic breeding ground for civil
rights protest movements as developed throughout the world. If it
is accepted that degrading social conditions breed anger and despair,
it must be recalled that, in this context, organized religion has also
served to divide the populace and foster religious intolerance. To
1. REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES
OF PHYSICAL BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9TH
AUGUST 1971, CMND. No. 4823 (Chairman Sir Edmund Compton); and the REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AUTHORIZED
PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM, CMND.
No. 4901 (Chairman Lord Parker, C.J.).
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see religion as the cause of the unrest is incorrect. I take the view
that religion is more the constant irritant rather than the cause of
the wound. The causes were, in fact, a rather volatile mixture of
social, political and religious factors coupled with the intransigence
of the government. The present chaotic state of affairs could not
have occurred had the ruling Unionist (Protestant) government
been even slightly aware of and responsive to the aspirations of the
minority. It should be noted that the Unionist Party has been in
power in Northern Ireland since 1921 when the state was created.
Northern Ireland became a province (with a high degree of au-
tonomy) and a member of the United Kingdom as a consequence
of the partition of Ireland by the British in 1920. The constitution
of Northern Ireland is found in the statute of partition namely, The
Government of Ireland Act, 1920,2 which was later characterized as
"A statutory abortion of December, 1920, sardonically entitled
'An Act to provide for the better government of Ireland'. ' '3 The
intention of the British Parliament was not to provide a constitution
for Northern Ireland but merely to establish an interim system of
government within both parts of Ireland and, as partition was thought
of as a temporary state of affairs, it was anticipated that this con-
stitutional statute would, ultimately, become a vehicle for the govern-
ment of Ireland as a whole.4 In fact, this interim measure became
"the constitution" and the Unionist majority successfully maintained
power until the British saw fit to suspend the Northern Ireland
Parliament in 1972.' It is important to note that jurisdiction over
the civil rights of Northern Ireland citizens was transferred to the
Northern Ireland Parliament (Stormont) by the Act of 1920.6
Since 1921, Northern Ireland has been beset with internal strife.
The fifth substantive statute enacted by the fledgling parliament was
specifically designed to cope with unrest. This statute, the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (N.I.) ,' was the enactment which
2. Government of Ireland Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67.
3. Cogan v. Minister of Finance, (1941] Ir. R. 389, 402.
4. CALVERT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 41 (1968).
5. Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, c. 22.
6. Note particularly the wording of S. 4 of the 1920 Act and see CALVERT, supra
note 4, at 41 et seq.
7. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5 (N.I.)
[hereinafter cited as Special Powers Act].
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permitted internment of suspects and such powers have been invoked
with some degree of regularity.8  In fact, internment has been
utilized during every decade throughout the fifty-two years of the
existence of Northern Ireland. This act was originally envisaged as
a temporary measure and a provision was inserted whereby it had to
be renewed by parliament on an annual basis. Annual renewal was
carried out until 1933 when this provision was dispensed with and
the act was made a permanent statute.0 It has remained in force
to this day.
Most enlightened people regard the United Kingdom as a demo-
cratic state and so several of the provisions of the Special Powers Act
may appear to be somewhat strange. For example, Section 1(1)
designates the Minister of Home Affairs (a Cabinet officer) to be
the "Civil Authority" referred to in the title of the act and states:
"[The Minister shall] take all such steps and issue all such orders
as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order."
In addition to these unlimited powers, Section 2(4) of the act confers
powers upon the Minister of Home Affairs that can only be thought
of as a major departure from common law principles:
If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to
the preservation of the peace or the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and
not specifically provided for in the regulations he shall be deemed guilty of an
offence against the regulations.
Such a provision is startling to say the least and is the antithesis of
the long established common law principle of nulla poena sine lege,
namely, that there must be no crime except in accordance with fixed
and predetermined law.
The Minister of Home Affairs also has jurisdiction over the police
and is empowered by Section 1 (2) to delegate all or any of the powers
contained in the act to any police officer. Detailed regulations were
passed pursuant to the power conferred in this act prohibiting several
forms of conduct,1" most notable of which are arrest without warrant,
8. See, e.g., Edwards, Special Powers in Northern Ireland, 1956 CRIM. L. REv. 7.
9. The Special Powers Act of 1922, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, § 2 (N.I.).
10. Briefly, the powers conferred under this act include the following: (1) Ar-
rest without warrant; (2) imprisonment without charge or trial and deny recourse
to habeas corpus or a court of law; (3) enter and search homes without warrant,
and with force, at any hours of day or night; (4) declare a curfew and prohibit
meetings, assemblies (including fairs and markets) and processions; (5) permit
punishment by flogging; (6) deny claim to a trial by jury; (7) arrest persons it
[Vol. XXII:553
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search without warrant and imprisonment without trial with the denial
of recourse to habeas corpus or court of law.
The existence and use of such powers in a democratic state con-
stitute a paradox. Many nations have, however, seen fit to enact
emergency legislation in time of war" or apprehended insurrection. 12
The difficulty lies in establishing order while at the same time mini-
mizing the infringement of liberty. The history of the Weimar
Republic is testimony to the fact that a democracy must, at times,
be protected and preserved by the use of emergency powers. Use
of sweeping powers such as this, however, implies a grave responsi-
bility on the part of the state toward its citizens:
Liberty depends upon a recognition of two realities: first, that men who mean to
enjoy it must run some risk for the sake of maintaining it; and, second, that through
excessive zeal, or through the incorrigibly corrupting influence of power, authority is
forever in danger of overstepping its boundaries.
The central problem of political science in a free society is the preservation of a
rational balance between order and liberty. It is quiie true, of course, that eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty. But it is imperative to remember that the vigilance
demanded by this maxim means vigilance against duly constituted authority-against
the forces of order. A resolute containment of those forces is the price of liberty. 1 3
Incarceration without trial derogates from long established notions
of criminal justice. For example, the Magna Carta provides that:
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed or outlawed or banished,
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by
the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.1 4
The Special Powers Act has been used almost exclusively against
members of the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. As
indicated above the scope of the powers are extremely wide and
permanent in nature. It is hardly surprising that the Civil Rights
is desired to examine as witnesses, forcibly detain them and compel them to answer
questions, under penalties, even if answers may incriminate them. Such a person is
guilty of an offense if he refuses to be sworn or answer a question; (8) do any
act involving interference with the rights of private property; (9) prevent access of
relatives or legal advisers to a person imprisoned without trial; (10) prohibit the
holding of an inquest after a person's death; (11) arrest a person who "by word
of mouth" spreads false reports or makes false statements; (12) prohibit the circu-
lation of any newspapers; (13) prohibit the possession of any film or gramophone
record.
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942).
12. See Holland, 13 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 148 (1960).
13. BARTH, PRICE OF LIBERTY 193 (1961).
14. Magna Carta of 1927, 24 Edw. 1; Halsbury's Statutes (2d Ed.) 20.
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Movement protested against this law in 1968 and sought its repeal.
Later, when protest turned to violence, these draconian powers were
used to incarcerate suspects including the leaders of the Civil Rights
Movement."
The campaign for civil rights in Northern Ireland focussed upon
six issues:
1. One-man-one-vote in local elections.
2. The removal of gerrymandered boundaries.
3. Laws against discrimination by local government, and the provision of machinery
to deal with complaints.
4. Allocation of public housing on a points (i.e., objective) system.
5. Repeal of the Special Powers Act.
6. Disbanding of the "B Special" police force. This was a wholly protestant armed
militia particularly hostile to the minority which was later disbanded and re-
placed by a similar creature entitled The Ulster Defense Regiment.'" 6
The government of Northern Ireland resisted the pressure for reform
and countered by banning civil rights demonstrations. A Commission
of Inquiry later observed that the advocated reforms were not such
as would "in any sense endanger the stability of the Constitution.""
The complaints of discrimination against Catholics in public housing
allocation, public employment and the allegations of gerrymandering
and unequal franchise (some had several votes, others none) were
substantiated and accepted by a Commission of Inquiry, reporting
in 1969,11 to be the major causes of unrest. It may seem, therefore,
that, of the many factors which caused the violence and loss of life, the
major impetus was provided by legitimate calls for basic civil rights
which were met by government intransigence and inept police hand-
ling of protest.'" With the closing of all avenues of protest, violence
escalated on the part of both the protestors and the police, who were
acting upon th6 orders of the Northern Ireland government.20
The importance of this factual content will become relevant later
during the discussion of the ethical questions involved but suffice
15. THE SUNDAY TIMES INsIGHT TEAM, NORTHERN IRELAND 264 (1972).
16. Id. at 49.
17. REPORT ON DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMND. No. 532 (1969)
(Chairman Lord Cameron).
18. Id. at 91 et seq.
19. Id. at 73.
20. REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN 1969,
CMND. No. 566 (1972) (Chairman Scarman, J.).
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it to say, at this stage, that alternative action does not seem to have
been seriously considered and the consequences of police action were
completely underestimated.2
Subsequent to the activation of British troops in the autumn of
1969, the civil strife increased. The principal response of the
government seems to have been largely an entrenchment of repres-
sion. 2 Against this backdrop, the size and prestige of the Irish
Republican Army (I.R.A.) rapidly increased and much of the vio-
lence that ensued has been attributed to this source. In August of
1971, the Northern Ireland Parliament invoked the internment
regulations made pursuant to powers conferred under the Special
Powers Act. By December of 1971, 1,576 men had been arrested
under this Act and 934 were subsequently released. 23 Those not so
fortunate as to be released remained in specially prepared prisons
24
and were not charged with any offence nor permitted to go to trial.
It may be reasonably inferred that enough evidence could not be
found to sustain a criminal prosecution. This is significant due to
the fact that scant evidence was required by magistrates and a soldier's
testimony was invariably accepted.25
Internment acted as a catalyst for the opposition to the government.
It is sufficient to state that internment is particularly resented by the
Catholic community of Northern Ireland for a number of deeply
felt reasons. The most shocking government activity was yet to be
revealed, however, and it fell to the English newspaper, the Sunday
Times, to expose disturbing allegations of brutality towards "suspects"
or "internees. 20  As a result of the widespread concern expressed
in England and Ireland over the mounting allegations of torture
and brutality, the British government appointed a Commission of
Inquiry led by the British Ombudsman, Sir Edmund Compton.27
The reasoning of the report of this inquiry led to the appointment of
21. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 50.
22. See, e.g., The Protection of the Person and Property Act 1969, c. 29 (N.I.);
Public Order (Amendment) Act 1970, c. 4 (N.I.); Criminal Justice (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1970, c. 22 (N.I.)..
23. Hansard, 16 December 1971.
24. Hansard, 25 November 1971, col. 1581.
25. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 287-88.
26. Id.
27. Compton Report, supra note 1.
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a second Committee of Inquiry chaired by the late Chief Justice
of England, Lord Parker. 28  Both Committees acknowledged the
existence of "ill-treatment" and it is the disturbing reasoning contained
in these reports that is the subject of this essay.
THE COMPTON AND PARKER REPORTS
The Compton Committee was established to inquire specifically into
the allegations of physical brutality inflicted upon those incarcerated
on August 9 of 1971, the first day of internment. In fact, this was
narrowed to the treatment of eleven men; three other cases were
later referred to the Committee as a result of subsequent articles
in the Sunday Times. 29  The Committee found that the allegations
were true in most of the cases referred to it. The "treatment" that
was found to exist included: enforced standing against a wall sup-
ported only by one finger of each hand for up to 43 1/2 hours;
the use of a special chamber in which suspects were placed and
subjected to continuous high pitched noise; prisoners were continually
hooded, barefoot and dressed only in coveralls; suspects were de-
prived of sleep, food and water; prisoners were forced to run barefoot
over rough ground; and they were beaten with batons to enforce
compliance with these procedures.
All except one of the eleven prisoners under investigation refused
to cooperate with the inquiry. In part, this was due to the fact that
the Committee sat in camera. Legal representatives were not al-
lowed to cross-examine witnesses and confrontation was not permitted
between complainants and persons against whom the complaints were
made. Legal representatives were not allowed access as of right to
transcripts of evidence. The Inquiry was, therefore, unacceptable
to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. 30
The Compton Report does, however, reveal an informative ac-
count of the harsh treatment accorded to suspects. For example,
28. Parker Report, supra note 1.
29. The terms of reference were: "To investigate allegations by those arrested
on 9 August under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)
1922 of physical brutality while in the custody of the security forces prior to either
their subsequent release, the preferring of a criminal charge or their being lodged in
a place specified in a detention order."
30. Brownlie, Compton & Parker Reports: Interrogations in Northern Ireland,
35 MODERN L. REV. 501 (1972).
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the matters referred to above were characterized as "ill-treatment"
but not "physical brutality."' The enforced barefoot run over
granite chippings may have caused some "unintended hardship." 2
The wall posture was to provide "security for detainees and guards."
Hooding was to "prevent identification" and continuous noise was
"to prevent their overhearing." The diet of bread and water was
"[to] form part of the atmosphere of discipline" while some of the
enforced rigorous exercises were "devised to conteract the cold."
Furthermore, the Committee examined these activities under sepa-
rate headings and seemed to be oblivious to the cumulative effect
of such treatment. It may be deduced that the report lacked a high
degree of credibility.
Two matters are of relevance at this point, namely the definition
of ill-treatment and brutality and the justification for such treat-
ment. On the issue of physical brutality, the Compton Committee
was quite specific:
Where we have concluded that physical ill-treatment took place, we are not making
a finding of brutality on the part of those who handled the complainants. We con-
sider that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, and that cruelty im-
plies a disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in,
the victim's pain. We do not think that happened here.33
A reasonable interpretation of this statement would be that bru-
tality is in the mind of the perpetrator, whereas ill-treatment can be
objectively measured. The law has for many years past been able
to determine cruelty. The notion of mens rea in criminal law
coupled with degrees of assault would usually suffice to differentiate
conduct of this sort. In passing, one may note that "cruelty" as such
has also been delineated in most jurisdictions in matters of domestic
relations. It is unclear as to whether the Committee accepted affi-
davits from the interrogators to the effect that they did not derive
pleasure from the infliction of pain. Indeed, the tone suggests that
the police interrogators were inherently incapable of inflicting cruel
or brutal punishment. It should be recalled that the violent and
bizarre behaviour of the Northern Ireland police had been docu-
mented by previous investigations.34
31. Id. at 502.
32. Id.
33. Compton Report, supra note 1, at para. 105.
34. See Cameron Report, supra note 17, and Scarman Report, supra note 20.
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The Committee then sought to offer justification for these methods
of interrogation in the following manner:
These methods have been used in support of the interrogation of a small number of
persons arrested in Northern Ireland who were believed to possess information of a
kind which it was operationally necessary to obtain as rapidly as possible in the
interests of saving lives.3 5
This supposition can be challenged on the facts. Revulsion to in-
ternment was so great that a virtual civil war ensued. Killing and
bombing increased dramatically and the arms uncovered by the
security forces as a result of information obtained remain almost
constant. 36  Moreover, this justification was utilized to sustain
conduct by the authorities against men who were not proven criminals
and who were shown not to possess the knowledge sought from them.
The publication of the Compton Report and the public outrage
and incredulity which ensued led to the appointment of the Parker
Committee.37 This committee was specifically appointed to "con-
sider authorized procedures" of interrogation of suspected terrorists.38
The Committee published a majority and a minority report on the
issue of the interrogation methods disclosed in the Compton Report."9
The majority rejected the view that it was impossible to justify ill-
treatment of prisoners by a "civilized and humane society."4  It
implied that such methods were the only means of saving lives.
Such simplistic reasoning will become relevant later when discussing
the ethical issues implicit in this notion. Furthermore, the majority
took the view that "discomfort and hardship" are matters that any
suspect under any conditions might reasonably expect to endure.4'
Discomfort, hardship, ill-treatment and torture were said to be
merely matters of opinion.42
The majority report then went on to note the illustrious history of
the Compton Report type of "ill-treatment" techniques developed
35. Compton Report, supra note 1, at para. 105.
36. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 295.
37. Id.
38. Parker Report, supra note 1, at (iii).
39. The majority report was submitted by Lord Parker, C.J. and J.A. Boyd-
Carpenter, Esq. The minority report was submitted by Lord Gardiner who, until
1970, was Lord Chancellor of England.
40. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 8.




by the British since World War II. Noting that their pedigree mi-
cluded, inter alia, Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden,
the majority went further and asserted that the purpose of the tech-
niques was to make the suspect "feel that he is in a hostile atmosphere
and subject to strict discipline. '43  In a curious way, the majority
concurred with the Compton Report in that it was seriously suggested
that some of the techniques were for the security and safety of the
prisoner. 4" Excessive use of these methods was seen as an adminis-
trative problem due to lack of manpower and "guidelines" were
proposed so that man-management problems would be alleviated in
the future when ill-treatment is utilized.45  "Guidelines" were pre-
ferred over "rules" as rules implied obedience and this could be
impractical." That is not to suggest that the majority were unaware
of the fact that the inherent "impracticability" of rules implied that
broader guidelines would also prove to be impractical. In this regard
it was proposed that a Cabinet Minister expressly approve future
ill-treatment acting upon the advice of a small, experienced commit-
tee appointed by the Prime Minister.47 The Committee further
recommended that a senior officer be "present at the interrogation
centre" 48 and that a medical doctor be present at all times in a
purely advisory capacity.4 9 Furthermore, it was argued that benefits
would accrue if a "panel of highly skilled interrogators" were kept
in being on a permanent basis.5"
The majority report also attempted to deal with the substantive
issue of the law and morality of the techniques of interrogation under
review. Alternative techniques used during World War II, such
as "bugging" and "stool pigeons" were examined and rejected. 5
As will be shown later, the fact that proven alternative methods
existed is significant from an ethical standpoint and, furthermore,
43. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 11.
44. Id.
45. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 13.
46. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 36.
47. The majority report did not express any opinion upon the qualifications
required for appointment to such a position.
48. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 39.
49. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 41.
50. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 40.
51. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 25.
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the majority merely asserted that lives were saved by the methods
used." In fact, killings increased significantly and cogent evidence
to support their assertion was not forthcoming."- The examination
of the alternatives concluded by noting that the techniques used
produced evidence more "quickly."54  It may be deduced, therefore,
that alternatives did exist but expediency dictated the choice of
options.
The majority reaffirm that they do not subscribe to the view
that "the end justifies the means" and go on to qualify this by stating
that the means must be "morally acceptable taking account of the
conditions prevailing." This issue is characterized as "emotive"
and really only a matter of degree. 5 The majority justification is
based upon the assertion that "urban guerrilla warfare" puts innocent
lives at risk and this, coupled with the needs of safety of staff and
suspects, is thought to be a higher moral value than that of ill-treating
or torturing innocent people.5 7 Indeed, the humanitarian provisions
of the Geneva Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners 8
were rejected on the basis that urban guerilla tactics made it "unre-
alistic" and "unfair" to apply such a criteria. 9 These reasons when
allied with the need for expediency were thought to dispose of the
moral issue raised by the use of ill-treatment of mere suspects." The
moral question was said to be "dependent on the intensity with which
these techniques are applied and on the provision of effective safe-
guards against excessive use.""' The substantive question of whether
evil means could be taken to justify desired ends was, consequently,
seen merely as a matter of degrees of evil. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the majority approach was that of merely ensuring that evil
52. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 24.
53. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 19, 20, 21 and 22.
54. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 26.
55. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 28 and 29.
56. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 30.
57. Id.
58. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, art. II
(1949).
59. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 32.
60. Id.
61. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 34.
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means were efficiently applied together with the use of bureaucratic
technique in instituting guidelines.
The minority report took a different approach. 62 After reiterating
the types of procedures in question, the minority report went on to
note that the Irish police interrogators were, in fact, trained in
April, 1971, which was three months prior to internment and that
the English training officers were present during the ill-treatment of
suspects in August.65 Thus, "expertise" was freely available for
some time prior to and during the period in question which raises
questions regarding the view of expert supervision taken by the
majority.
The minority report vigourously dissents from the view expressed
in the Compton Report regarding the definition of brutality in which
it was asserted that the perpetrator must derive pleasure from the
infliction of pain:4
Lest by silence I should be thought to have accepted this remarkable definition, I
must say that I cannot agree with it. Under this definition, which some of our
witnesses thought came from the Inquisition, if an interrogator believed, to his
great regret, that it was necessary for him to cut off the fingers of a detainee one
by one to get the required information out of him for the sole purpose of saving
life, this would not be cruel and, because not cruel, not brutal. 6 5
The author of the minority report, Lord Gardiner, then skillfully
analyzed the legality of ill-treatment and concluded that the methods
"were and are illegal." 6  The legality under international law was
examined, although Lord Gardiner refrained from expressing an
opinion as the issue was then before the European Commission on
Human Rights and the matter was deemed sub judice 7
The minority report took the view that the moral issue could
only be examined from the standpoint of the effects of ill-treatment.6
Put another way, the use of evil means was examined from the
standpoint not only of the desired end, or the end in view, but all
62. Parker Report, supra note 1, at 11, para. 3.
63. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 6.
64. Parker Report, supra note 1, at 13.
65. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 7(d).
66. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 10(d).
67. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 11(b) (iv).
68. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 12.
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other significant consequences of the means used. The consequences
were thought, by the majority, to provide a justification, but the
minority report analyzed the effects under several headings in addi-
tion to the notion of "saving innocent lives." These effects were:
(1) The effect on the detainees both physical and mental; (2) their
effect on the obtaining of information; (3) their effect on the
relation between the forces of law and order and the people of
Northern Ireland; and (4) their effect on the reputation of the United
Kingdom."9 On the first issue the minority noted that the mental
effects could be gauged from the opinion of medical experts. It
was pointed out that the techniques in question were known to cause,
inter alia, artificial psychosis, episodic insanity, unbearable anxiety,
tension, attacks of panic and nightmares. 70  The cumulative effects
of the several techniques used simultaneously against the suspects
is, of course, a matter of speculation as psychiatrists have not had the
opportunity to observe such procedures in the past. 71
On the second issue, the minority report pointed out that, as so
many people were questioned at one time, it might reasonably be
anticipated that more information in quantum might be forthcoming. 72
The dramatic increase in knowledge gained by the security forces
could not, logically, be presumed to be exclusively attributable to
the methods used. On the issue of urgency it was noted that during
World War II (when Britain faced very grave dangers) other methods
such as "stool pigeons" were found to be both effective and speedy
against prisoners of war.73  Furthermore, as the interrogation, plan-
ning and training had commenced several months earlier, there was
in fact, ample time available to train interrogation teams in the
use of the civilized and subtle methods used in World War 11.7' The
minority report concluded that: "I am not persuaded that substan-
tially as much information might not have been obtained by those
methods. '75  Thus the minority took the view that not only did
69. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 13 et seq.
70. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 13(i) and 13(iii).
71. Id.






alternatives exist but that the consequences may have been similar
with regard to the "end in view."
On the third point, which may be characterized as a secondary
consequence or side effect, Lord Gardiner was of the opinion that
the effect on the relation of the forces of law and order and the
populace depended largely upon "how far they have the sympathy of
the local population against the guerillas. ' '7  This was deemed to be
impossible to determine. It may be argued, however, that a guerilla
army cannot sustain a long and expensive campaign without a high
degree of approval from a significant segment of the populace. More-
over, the popularity of the I.R.A. in 1971 was positively increased
by the use of internment and torture.7 7 Furthermore, guerilla activi-
ties, which logically require support of many people in an urban
setting, increased dramatically and this increase has been sustained. 78
It is suggested, therefore, that this effect or secondary consequence
may have, in fact, frustrated the end in view as the publication of the
evil means gravely exacerbated a major side effect.
On the issue of the reputation of the United Kingdom in the
world at large, Lord Gardiner cited several international agree-
ments on human rights together with recent pronouncements of
world religious organizations and deduced that a secondary conse-
quence would be that Britain's reputation and standing would in-
deed suffer.79
Other observations of note in the minority report include the
opinion that the majority report's panacea of ministerial supervision
would be illegal and distasteful.8" Moreover the view was expressed
that neither in logic nor in morals could any limit to the degree of
ill-treatment be legalized.8' Lord Gardiner capsulized his reasoning
in this manner:
I do not believe ... in emergency terrorist conditions, or even in war against a
ruthless enemy, such procedures are morally justifiable against those suspected of
76. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 15.
77. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 269.
78. Id. at 268.
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having information of importance to the police or army, even in the light of any
marginal advantages which may thereby be obtained. 82
It may be appreciated, therefore, that the thrust of the minority
report was to question the desired end and the secondary conse-
quences. This had the effect of putting the justification, that is
the end in view, in a wider perspective. The ethical principles and
analysis will be further examined later in this paper. I take the
view that the minority report is to be preferred not only for its sound
legal reasoning and humane approach but also because of the correct
consideration of the ethical issue of an evil means justifying a desired
end.
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
Since August of 1971, many British and Northern Irish political
and legal authorities have sought to justify the use of ill-treatment
of detainees by reference to the normal use of punishment in the
criminal process. Reliance has been placed upon theories of retri-
bution, and deterrence, which, it is assumed, lie at the root of the
criminal sanction.8 I propose to briefly examine contemporary
theories of punishment and, in particular, recent British writings in
this area.
British legal philosophers have traditionally adopted a linguistic
approach to the justification of punishment, and the focus of juris-
prudential writing remains concentrated upon definition. Generally
speaking, distinctions may be drawn between the linguistic or moral-
istic approaches and between utilitarian or retributive solutions.
Flew has provided a definition of punishment that is not at variance
with most British thinkers.84  He characterizes the essential elements
of punishment on a five point basis:
(1) punishment must involve the imposition of suffering or deprivation;
(2) it must involve the suffering or deprivation of an offender;
(3) the offender must suffer for his offence;
(4) the suffering or deprivation must be imposed by a human agency; and
(5) the punishing agency must be authorized to impose the punishment.
It may be deduced, therefore, that ill-treatment of Irish political
prisoners does not fall within headings (3) and (5) of this definition
82. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 20(1).
83. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 296.
84. FLEW, THE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT 291 (1954).
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as no offense had been committed and the authorities acted illegally.
It will be assumed, but not conceded, for the sake of analysis that
all those detained under the Special Powers Act were in fact "offend-
ers" and that it was merely lack of evidence that prevented prose-
cution.8 5 Moreover, the legality of the acts in question will be as-
sumed at this stage.
Many British thinkers are preoccupied with differences of justi-
fication-between justifying punishment as a whole, degrees of pun-
ishment and justifying the decision to impose a given amount of
punishment on a particular offender in a specific case. To some
degree the reasoning of the majority in the Parker Report 86 re-
flected this approach. In general, philosophers lean to the view
that degrees of societal response are justified on the basis of reforma-
tion and deterrence. Emphasis on deterrence is strange in the light
of recent developments in psychological thinking 7 and the use by
the Scandanavian Realists of psychoanalytical thinking on such
issues.""
The issue of punishment of innocent people is ususally discussed
in utilitarian terms. In brief, the matter is thought to be related to
the fact that an innocent person may be punished to promote in-
creased criminal deterrence. Two related questions are raised here:
(a) is it logically possible to call the imposition of suffering upon
the innocent "punishment" and,
(b) is it ever morally justified to impose suffering upon the inno-
cent in order to achieve a greater social good.
It must be realized that it is not necessarily improper to term suf-
fering inflicted upon the innocent "punishment" when it is recognized
that the innocent may be punished accidently. The punishment of the
innocent as the norm would mean that it would be a linguistic im-
possibility within the context of the generally accepted definition
supplied by Flew. 9 The usual example cited when "punishment of
the innocent" is discussed is that of punishment of a next of kin.
As to whether such punishment could ever be justified on moral
85. On the issue of rule-breaking see Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MINDm 152 (1939).
86. Parker Report, supra note 1, at 12 et seq.
87. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT (1954).
88. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 124 (1939).
89. FLEW, supra note 84, at 24.
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grounds, opinion is divided. Some argue that such a proposition is
totally unacceptable, 90 while others, notably Flew, argue that it
might be permitted in exceptional circumstances. 9 H.L.A. Hart
takes the view that a permanent use of punishment of the innocent
would develop an insecurity in the populace and thus offset any
possible deterrent effect. 92  Hart distinguishes both the utilitarian
and the linguist positions on the basis that both views prevent an
evaluation of
the rational and moral status of our preference for a system of punishment under
which measures painful to individuals are to be taken against them only when they
have committed an offence. 93
Hart argues that legal and punitive judgements must be distinguished
and that no one principle of punishment is applicable in either all
cases or all stages of the punishment process.9 4 The theories of deter-
rence, retribution and rehabilitation cannot provide a composite
rationale of justification as they are in conflict. Hart states:
What is needed is the realization that different principles (each of which may in a
sense be called a justification) are relevant at different points in any morally ac-
ceptable account of punishment. 95
An interesting contribution to this debate has been provided by
an eminent American scholar, Professor Jerome Hall. 90 Punish-
ment is described by Hall in the following terms:
First, punishment is a privation (evil, pain, disvalue). Second, it is coercive. Third,
it is inflicted in the name of the State; it is 'authorized.' Fourth, punishment
presupposes rules, their violation, and a more or less formal determination of that,
expressed in a judgment. Fifth, it is inflicted upon an offender who has committed
a harm, and this presupposes a set of values by reference to which both the harm
and the punishment are ethically significant. Sixth, the extent or type of punishment
is in some defended way related to the commission of the harm, and aggravated or
mitigated by reference to the personality of the offender, his motives and tempta-
tion. 97
On first inspection Hall's definition is appealing as it attempts a
degree of precision which is noticeably absent in other such treatises.
90. Mabbott, supra note 85, at 159.
91. FLEw, supra note 84, at 293.
92. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1960).
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 3.
96. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW ch. 9 (2d ed. 1960).
97. Id. at 310.
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Hall's proposition that legality and responsibility presuppose that
a definite crime has been committed would rule out any possibilty
of regarding the severe "treatment" of guerrilla suspects as "punish-
ment." It must be noted, however, that contemporary society deals
with anti-social behaviour in a variety of ways, including the civil
commitment of narcotics addicts. Although the purpose of such
"treatment" is not punitive, it may be argued that Hall's definition
may be too narrow so that all modem dispositional alternatives
would not be recognized.
What is readily apparent in the writings of contemporary Anglo-
American penologists and legal philosophers is that the notion of
punishment is dependent upon the initial goals or purpose used to
justify punishment. Justification may be thought of as the key
element in the debate. Much philosophical writing has an air of
unreality about it due to the fact that many modes of punishment
in daily use cannot, without considerable difficulty, be rationalized
against the analytically determined purpose or goals.98
It may be argued that a period of national emergency or internal
crisis may legitimately place a heavier reliance on the deterrent aspect
of justification of punishment. In the Irish context it may be sug-
gested that the justificatory purpose or goal of repressive legislation
and severe punishment is to bring about a fear in the mind of the
potentially dangerous and thereby lead to a higher degree of social
order in what is, admittedly, a near state of armed insurrection.
The severity of punishment in a situation in which heavy sanctions
are used as a deterrent depends, of course, upon the good sense and
lack of abuse upon the part of the authorities. In a wholly calamitous
situation as here envisaged it may be argued that a system of severe
punishment based upon deterrence can also fulfill its purpose by
punishing the innocent as well as the guilty. Thus, according to
this view innocent people, or suspects, may be punished as a deter-
rent in order to achieve a larger social goal, namely the benefit of
stability to society at large. The justificatory use of deterrence in
times of emergency when legislative checks and balances are legally
removed means that much of the debate which is in definitional
terms is per curiam. In a crisis a state will respond within what it
98. One is conscious of the widespread use of such techniques as strip-cells and
compulsory prison work projects in this regard.
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believes to be necessary and harsh measures in order to preserve the
very fabric of the state. If this is so, the definitional niceties of the
philosophical debate seem inappropriate. Nevertheless, the justifi-
cation of goals may be tested against ethical principles. Whether
deterrence achieves its end, albeit by draconian methods as in
Northern Ireland, is one question. Another and highly significant
issue is whether such repressive measures, which I will characterize
as "an evil means," can justify a good or socially desirable "end."
It is to the ethical question that one now turns for an examination of
this issue.
THE ETHICAL ISSUE: THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS?
Certain actions, whether performed by individuals or govern-
ments, such as those involving cruelty or torture, provoke an in-
tuitive or spontaneous response from most reasonable men. This
may be termed "moral revulsion." Such intuitive thinking in moral
philosophy is illustrated by the following example from William
James:
If the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which Messrs. Fourier's and Bellamy's
utopias should be all outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the one
simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a
life of lonely torture, what except a specifical and independent sort of emotion can
it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an impulse arose within
us to clutch at the happiness so offered, how hideous a thing would be its enjoy-
ment when deliberately accepted as the fruit of such a bargain. 9 9
Clearly, happiness achieved in such an unfair or unjust manner
to the unfortunate individual would never be acceptable to a moralist.
Furthermore, even utilitarians would probably argue against such
a proposition by interpreting social utility in a broad manner. Thus
a utilitarian might be expected to argue that if every human soul
has an infinite value per se then utilitarian calculus will not allow the
sacrifice of one for the sake of several others. The Compton'
and Parker 1 ' Reports are not alone, however, in purporting to
justify immoral or evil actions such as cruelty by use of rational
argument. Undoubtedly the most notorious attempt at justificiation
of evil means is that of Machiavelli.
99. JAMES, THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE 68 (1948).
100. Parker Report, supra note 1.
101. Parker Report, supra note 1.
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I say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He
must, however, take care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was con-
sidered cruel, but his cruelty had brought order to the Romagna, united it, and re-
duced it to peace and realty. If this is considered well, it will be seen that he was
really much more merciful than the Florentine people, who to avoid the name of
cruelty, allowed Pistosia to be destroyed. A prince, therefore, must not mind in-
curring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and
faithful; for, with a very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who,
from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring bloodshed
and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions
carried out by the prince injure only individuals .... 102
An example of an individual who was "ill-treated" by Cesare Borgia
was his minister, one de Orco, a cruel man who had by cruel but
effective means brought peace and social order to his country.
As Borgia knew that the harshness of the past engendered some amount of hatred,
in order to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely, he re-
solved to show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but
through the harsh disposition of his minister. And having found the opportunity he
had him (de Orco) cut in half and placed one morning in the public square at
Cesena with a piece of wood and bloodstained knife by his side. The ferocity of
this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and amazement .... 103
Naturally Borgia's murder of de Orco and de Orco's harsh treat-
ment of the populace strike the impartial observer as outrageous.
Machiavelli takes the view, however, that such moral revulsion is
neither "moral" nor "philosophical," but rather an expression of
mere uninformed sentimentality. Machiavelli argues that such ac-
tions are, in fact, justified by their consequences, namely the ultimate
social good made available to society at large. He suggests that if
Borgia had been humanitarian and had not murdered de Orco then
the resentment of the populace may have erupted into violence and
many hundreds of innocent people may have been killed in the
ensuing civil strife. Thus, it is argued that the avoidance of such
an end was clearly desirable and "moral" and that "in the actions of
men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the
end justifies the means.' 1 0 4
In a similar fashion the Compton and Parker Reports on the ill-
treatment of Irish political prisoners sought to justify the cruel or
harsh treatment admittedly performed upon mere suspects by refer-
ence to the information received and illegal arms captured directly
102. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 60 (1950).
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 30.
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resulting from the treatment. Both reports alluded to the necessity of
such activities if "innocent lives" were to be saved. On the other
hand the minority opinion of Lord Gardiner in the Parker Report
took the opposite view, in fact the moralist position similar to James
(above), when he asserted that ill-treatment of prisoners could never
be morally justified. 10
It is suggested that Lord Gardiner's view, when seen in the context
of his whole dissenting opinion, is that some actions, such as ill-
treatment of suspects, are intrinsically wrong or, put another way,
wrong whatever their consequences may be. Such a notion implies
that a moral determination may be made independently of an ex-
amination of consequences. This intuitionist approach has a major
disadvantage, however, in that it provides no rational method of
resolving disagreements over moral issues. Thus if X does not share
Y's intuitions, then Y has no recourse to any further principle by
which it might be demonstrated that X is in error.
If, on the other hand, one accepts the consequentialist approach
explicit in the Compton and Parker viewpoints, then rational argu-
ment about moral issues is possible and questions of rightness and
wrongness of action such as ill-treatment can be reduced to a factual
question, namely what are the likely consequences of that action.
It should be noted that even if it is agreed that one may ascertain the
consequences of a given act, then it is still possible to disagree in
appraising the value, i.e. the goodness or badness, of those conse-
quences. This difference is illustrated by the fact that one may
disagree with Machiavelli in his opinion cited above but may find
it easy to agree with him that order is good and anarchy bad.
Consequentialism means that it is possible for one to possess a
rational ground for moral decision. Thus it is the duty of the state,
in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, not to inflict pain upon innocent
people but it is also the duty of the state to protect and foster the
general good. Occasions will occur when the duties of a government
will conflict and a choice will have to be made, that is, whether to
inflict harm upon innocent people or harm the citizenry in general.
Consequentialists would resolve such a conflict of duties by arguing
that a rational approach would determine that the action proposed
should be chosen from the alternatives available which, taking ac-
105. Parker Report, supra note 1, para. 20.
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count of all available evidence, seems most likely to have the best
consequences for all concerned. Such an approach is explicit in the
majority view in the Parker Report wherein alternatives are evalu-
ated and rejected. 10 6
A major argument for acceptance of the consequentialist position
and for finding a way of combating Machiavelli or Parker on their
own terms is that the outright rejection of consequentialism on moral
grounds is at odds with the ordinary activities of everyday life. By
this it is suggested that everyone performs acts in life that are prima
facie bad but are manifestly just when viewed in the light of the
end achieved. A proponent of the Parker view could, therefore,
accuse an opponent of inconsistency or even hypocrisy. The accu-
sation of hypocrisy is evident in the view of Ivanov, a character
created by Koestler, who states:
The principle that the end justifies the means is and remains the only rule of a
political ethic; anything else is just vague chatter and melts away between one's
fingers .... 107
Ivanov uses this view to "justify" the murder of millions of Russian
kulaks and, when Rubiskov remains unconvinced, he accuses him of
inconsistency and hypocrisy:
'For a man with your past,' Ivanov went on, 'this sudden revulsion against experi-
menting is rather naive. Every year several million people are killed quite point-
lessly by epidemics and other natural catastrophes. And we should shrink from
sacrificing a few hundred thousand for the most promising experiment in history?
Not to mention the legions of those who die of undernourishment and tuberculosis
in coal and quicksilver mines, rice-fields, and cotton plantations. No one takes any
notice of them; nobody asks why or what for; but if here we shoot a few hundred
thousand objectively harmful people, the humanitarians all over the world foam at
the mouth. Yes, we liquidated the parasitic part of the peasantry and let it die of
starvation. It was a surgical operation which had to be done once and for all; but in
the good old days before the Revolution just as many died in any dry year-only
senselessly and pointlessly. The victims of the Yellow River floods in China amount
sometimes to hundreds of thousands. Nature is generous in her senseless experiments
on mankind. Why should mankind not have the rights to experiment on himself?'
He paused; Rubiskov did not answer. He went on: 'Have you ever read brochures
of an anti-vivisectionist society? They are shattering and heartbreaking; when one
reads how some poor cur which has had its liver cut out, whines and licks his
tormentor's hands, one is just as nauseated as you were tonight. But if these people
had their say, we would have no serums against cholera, typhoid, or diptheria .... 108
Implicit in this statement is the view that if one good end justifies
106. Parker Report, supra note 1, para. 25.
107. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 161 (1941).
108. Id. at 161-62.
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the bad means in one instance, so it must in the other. In order to
avoid the charge of inconsistency one may concede, for analytical
purposes only, that their rightness or wrongness is always a function of
the goodness or badness of their consequences. If such a proposition
is accepted, then the moral issues become somewhat complicated
and the application of the consequentialist principle comes to the
fore.
A consequentialist may hold that it is good or right to cut off a
man's leg in order to save his life, or even that it is right to deprive
people of their freedom of movement in order to stop an epidemic,
but may not agree that it is right to shoot lazy factory workers in
order to increase productivity or torture political prisoners. In other
words, by adopting the consequentialist approach one may argue that
a bad means does justify a good end in some cases without incurring
the charge of inconsistency. Naturally such a stance is only justified
when other conditions are fulfilled.
When it is suggested that the end justifies the means the word
"means" may be taken as "that which will be brought about more
immediately by the contemplated act," that is, the relatively immediate
results or consequences of that action while "end" may be inter-
preted as "any of the secondary, or relatively remote consequences of
the act." It is convenient to use the term "end in view" to mean
those foreseen consequences or ends for the sake of which one acts,
that is, the purpose or reason for the activity. In the case of ill-
treatment of suspects in Northern Ireland the immediate result, the
means, was the infliction of physical pain and deprivation which is
clearly evil in itself but which will in turn bring about the secondary
result, the end in view, namely the saving of innocent lives and the
restoration of law and order which is clearly good. The issue now
turns upon a consideration of the conditions under which one may
say that the good end in view counterbalances the evil of the bad
means, thus justifying the action which produced both of them. It is
suggested that the following three conditions must apply: (1) No
less odious means are available; (2) all consequences of the means
are considered and not merely the end in view; and (3) the more
probable consequences are given greater "weight" than the less prob-
able ones.
It may be seen that, just as Cesare Borgia's end might have been
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achieved by merely denouncing de Orco and exiling him, there were
less odious means available to the government of Northern Ireland
other than internment without trial and ill-treatment. Indeed the
Northern Ireland government appointed a committee which reported
in 1970 that the Special Powers Act was "demonstrably despotic,
and much of it meaningless or unenforcable or both."' 9  Further-
more, the government really had little idea as to who should be the
recipient of the evil means. Of the 1,500 people arrested it seems
that only 120-130 were actually suspected of being "gunmen" while
300-500 were merely sympathizers. Others were arrested simply
because they were active in the Civil Rights movement. Indeed the
army and the police could not agree on who to arrest.110
It is now clear that less odious means were available to the Northern
Ireland government. The British Army was opposed to intern-
ment as were the Irish police. Moreover, it seems that only the
Northern Ireland government and, in particular, the Prime Minister,
Mr. William Faulkner, were actively advocating the use of intern-
ment without trial."' The British Army proposed four alternatives:
curfew, traffic searches on a large scale, sealing the border, and whole-
sale block searches. These were rejected largely because the com-
mercial life of Northern Ireland would have been adversely af-
fected." '2 Furthermore, it may be argued that as 100,000 firearms
remained lawfully in private hands an alternative would have been
to declare all possession of firearms a criminal offence and impound
all weapons. 13 As the vast majority of weapons were in Protestant
hands, it is not surprising that this alternative does not seem to have
even been considered by the authorities.
It is surely obvious, however, that the major alternative would have
been the granting of civil rights to Roman Catholics. This would
have entailed the extension of the franchise in local elections, the
abolition of gerrymandering, the ending of discrimination in employ-
ment and housing, the reintroduction of proportional representation,
the disbanding of para-military Protestant police reservists and the
establishment of a liaison with the Republic of Ireland. In other
109. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 199.
110. ld. at 264.
111. Id. at 266.
112. Id. at 265.
113. Id. at 300.
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words, far less odious means were present at all times and responsive
government was the key to this. Means such as this, however,
imply a sharing of power with the minority in the face of which the
government remained intransigent, thus opting for internment.
On the specific issue of ill-treatment of suspects interned, Lord
Gardiner makes it clear in his minority report that not only were
other methods of interrogation available but that these alternative
methods had been used to great effect during World War II when,
inter alia, speed was of the essence."'
The second condition upon which consequentialism is dependent
necessitates that all consequences of the means are considered and
not merely the "end in view." What is suggested here is that, to the
consequentialist, secondary consequences or side effects are as im-
portant, from the moral standpoint, as the end in view. One major
side effect alluded to above was that there followed a large and sus-
tained increase in killing and other guerrilla activities. Indeed, by
comparison, the period before internment and ill-treatment now
looks almost placid. One foreseeable consequence of the cruelty
was that sympathy for the recipients of such treatment would in-
crease. Thus the influence, power and manpower of the I.R.A.
rapidly expanded amongst the Catholic minority." 5  This side effect
alone tended to make the evil means wholly counterproductive.
Although rioting as a consequence had been foreseen, the warfare
that followed may not have been envisaged. Nevertheless, the
casualty figures increased by over 14 times the pre-internment rate,"'
and the increase in repression must have implied an increase in kill-
ings, even to the Northern Ireland government. Moreover, as over
60 per cent of the detained suspects were rapidly released (without a
charge being laid), it should have been foreseen that the innocent
recipients of harsh treatment thus released would only become more
embittered as would their families and friends. Internment and
cruelty seems to have had the foreseeable side effect or secondary
consequence of alienating the Catholic middle-class which had hith-
erto been a predominantly moderate and restraining influence." 7 In
this regard the net effect seems to have been the destruction of any
114. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 14.
115. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 15, at 273.
116. Id. at 269.
117. Id. at 270.
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possibility of a rapprochement between the Catholic "moderates" and
the government. As such the evil means heralded the demise of the
State. 118
The third condition of consequentialism acknowledges that a bad
or evil means to a good end in view cannot be justified if it is not
in fact a means to that end in view. If some good state of affairs will
not in fact be a consequence of an act it cannot be used to justify
that action. Difficulties arise due to the ignorance or uncertainty as to
consequences and such ignorance is often a matter of factual as
opposed to moral ignorance. If one acts to bring about a result,
one predicts that the act and result will be related as cause and effect;
and statements of causal connection in a complex or crisis situation
between events and predictions of the future are notoriously innacu-
rate.
Probability is, however, a matter of degree and the issue of re-
moteness is highly relevant. Thus the repressive measures of the
Stalin era may "eventually" realize the dictatorship of the proleteriat
or a communist utopia, but such a prediction is not a matter of
science but more an article of faith based upon certain "laws of
history." Similarly, the use of counter-terror by the government of
Northern Ireland is based upon a non-scientific probability that
such actions will succeed in producing law and order without the
concession that the return to the status quo is tantamount to a
return to nineteenth century government in the twentieth century.
This condition of consequentialistic justification simply asserts
that in any assessment of the value of the consequences of an act,
the remote and therefore less probable consequences are to count
less than relatively near and more probable ones. It may be deduced
that the goodness or badness of the means itself is the single most
important consideration which will be outweighed by the goodness
of the end in view only when the prediction that the means will in
fact produce that end in view is highly probable. If the immediate
consequence of a proposed act is very certain and very evil, as with
cruelty toward political prisoners, then it follows that a higher degree
of probability that the end in view which is to justify it will in fact
result.
The question then becomes, what is the goal of cruelty and counter-
terrorism by the government of Northern Ireland. If the utterances
118. Id. at 280 et seq.
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of the political leaders are to be believed, the goal is the attainment
of "law and order" so as to provide "internal stability" in order that
a state of "normalcy may be resumed." Simply stated, the aim is
a return to the status quo and anything less that that will be, and
is presently in the process of being, resisted by the militant factions
of the majority regime. It is clear that the "end" of a diminution
of terror and a return to the status quo would be unacceptable to
any member of the Catholic minority who is capable of thought.
The probable result, and on the facts, the actual result, of repressive
measures on the part of the state including cruelty and incarceration
without trial can only mean an increased response and an escalation
of terrorism. The end in view, therefore, cannot be achieved. This
being so, one might concur with the English newspaper, the Sunday
Times:
Internment has been used for a political end and it does not even appear to have
been well used. British soldiers have been used to support the principle of Protestant
supremacy.119
Consequentialism, if it is to have any validity, must contain a skeptical
view of any alleged causal connection between the evil means and the
end in view. The Parker Report was in error, therefore, in blithely
accepting the view that "innocent lives had been saved" and thus
failing in its duty not to overestimate the factual knowledge available.
In much the same manner as the reasoning of Machiavelli can be
rejected by a consequentialist because the above three conditions
are not met, so also one may reject the Compton and Parker Reports.
It is significant that the good consequences cited by the Compton
and Parker Reports which, presumably, sprang from internment and
cruelty were unsubstantiated by cogent evidence. This much was
clearly indicated by Lord Gardiner in his minority report. 2 ' Comp-
ton and Parker cannot be considered skeptical and cannot be thought
of as discharging their duty not to overestimate factual knowledge.
It is clear from the reasoning of both the majority and the minority
opinions in the Parker Report that: (1) Less odious means were
available; (2) that all consequences of the means (and not merely
the end in view) were not considered; and (3) that the more prob-
able consequences (such as sympathy for guerrillas and intensified
warfare) were not properly evaluated and weighed. This being the
119. Sunday Times, 15 August 1971.
120. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 14.
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case, the conclusions of the Reports can be met and mastered on
their own terms utilizing a consequentialist approach. Moreover,
a utilitarian in such circumstances as described here would have little
difficulty in distinguishing the justification offered by Parker, as
clearly the sacrifice of human rights and dignity via the vehicle of
cruelty cannot be contemplated, especially if conditions (2) and
(3) were absent exposing a high degree of "chance" in the alleged
causal connection. The strict moralist would not, of course, have
even entertained such an argument. 2' Lord Gardiner's strength
lies in his isolation of the four effects, which include side effects.
Although his conclusion is a moralistic one his reasoning and anal-
ysis also support the consequentialist approach.
It is submitted that the above reasoning gives support to the fol-
lowing propositions: (a) The infliction of cruelty or ill-treatment
upon persons merely suspected of an offence cannot properly be
regarded as criminal punishment; and (b) the use of cruelty towards
political prisoners cannot be justified on moral or utilitarian grounds;
and (c) the ill-treatment of Irish political prisoners cannot be
justified upon the basis of ethical reasoning. As was noted by Lord
Gardiner, the acts in question were illegal 122 and it is fitting to note
the now famous maxim of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "Crime is con-
tagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law.' 112 3
The strange affairs that continue to plague Ireland continue to
be handled in an inept manner. Internment and ill-treatment is
merely another chapter in a rather sorry saga. It must be recalled
that the activities in question in this paper took place in 1971 and,
furthermore, in the United Kingdom and not a "banana republic."
It is at once disturbing and depressing that the fountainhead of the
Common Law, Great Britain, should be guilty of cruel and unusual
treatment of suspected dissenters. It is no less surprising that two
reports (excluding the lone dissent of Lord Gardiner) should seek
to justify such inhumanity on grounds which, as one may now see,
range from tenuous to totally spurious.
121. See JAMES, supra note 99 at 30.
122. Parker Report, supra note 1, at para. 10(d).
123. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
AND POLITICAL BROADCAST REFORM
WILLIAM D. WICK*
HE FIRST political campaigns in America were relatively staid,
inexpensive affairs: campaigning took the form of speeches
by supporters "from stump and pulpit, of debate in the highly
partisan press, of private correspondence, and of persuasive activi-
ties on election day."' In 1832, Andrew Jackson's campaign
initiated the "torchlight era," a period of campaigning characterized
by organized torchlight processions and hickory poll raisings. By
1880 an increase in the number of printing presses and a decrease
in the price of paper resulted in the beginning of the "era of cam-
paign literature." Radio became the dominant campaign medium
in 1928, as eight million radios put politicians in touch with 40
million Americans.2 In 1952 the era of television campaigning
began.
Today, ninety-five percent of all American homes have at least
one television set-and those sets are turned on for an average of
five and one-half hours each day.' Sixty percent of the American
* Special Assistant to U.S. Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr., B.A. Northwestern
University; presently enrolled at Georgetown University Law Center.
1. A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 401-06 (1960). This book is one
of the most acclaimed works on campaign finance reform.
2. R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE 127 (1968). Radio was used in the
1924 campaign, as Coolidge outspent Democrat John W. Davis, $120,000 to
$40,000 for radio time. Radio's dominance did not begin until 1928, however.
Id.
3. Television's first significant appearance was in 1948. Republican con-
tenders Thomas E. Dewey and Harold E. Stassen participated in a broadcast de-
bate in the Oregon primary. Television's dominance began in 1952, however,
when millions were spent on it by Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson. It
was also in 1952 that Vice-Presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon utilized tele-
vision to save his spot on the ticket with his famous "Checkers" speech. Id.
at 127-28.
4. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME, REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA 6
(1969).
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people rely primarily on television for their news-'
The potency of television as a means of political communica-
tion and persuasion is unsurpassed.6  The use of television by
presidents has increased steadily over the past twenty years be-
cause the TV has proven itself to be an incredibly effective tool in
molding public opinion on national issues.7  Senator Edward Ken-
nedy emphasized television's superiority over other forrrs of politi-
cal communication:
The recent political landscape of America is strewn with the graves of incumbents
and challengers, blitzed into defeat by an unlimited assault of television spending.
But I know of no candidate blitzed into defeat by a similar assault of newspaper
advertisements, or billboards, or mass mailings, or bumper stickers, or hats, or hand-
bills, or lapel buttons. They simply do not have the impact of television, and every
politician knows it. No amount of spending on these other media can possibly offset
the role of television and the impression it makes on voters. 8
For presidential and senatorial candidates, television is a neces-
sity.9 Many congressional and local candidates campaign exten-
5. S. MICKELSON, THE ELECTRIC MIRROR 25 (1972).
6. Candidates who have spent large amounts of money on TV have lost.
See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1970, at 77. But many more have won, and the
candidates who lost might have lost by greater margins were it not for TV. In
addition, of course, TV can lose votes if it is used ineffectively.
7. According to White House statistics, during his first 18 months in office
President Nixon appeared on prime-time television 14 times, a figure which sur-
passes the combined prime-time appearances of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy
during each of their first 18 months in office. CONG. QUARTERLY, Jan. 29, 1972,
at 205.
Public opinion polls reflect the amazing impact of television used by American
Presidents. According to a Harris survey, 7 percent of the public supported the
invasion of Cambodia before President Nixon's April 30, 1970, television address
on the invasion; following the address, more than 50 percent approved his action.
Similarly, before President Johnson's televised speech on the Gulf of Tonkin inci-
dent in 1964, less than half of the American people supported his Vietnam pol-
icy; after the speech, according to Harris, more than 70 percent approved of this
Vietnam program. Id.
8. Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions of tile Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 173 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 382].
9. Some candidates have been elected in recent years without relying primar-
ily on television-most notably Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) and Gov. Daniel
Walker (D-Ill.). Both conducted extensive "walking tours" of their respective
states. Even a walking campaign has to be supplemented by TV, however. As
Rep. Jim Wright (D-Tex.) indicated, his campaign for the Senate in Texas proved
fallacious his belief "that a determined man in good health could make up by
prodigious personal effort what he lacked in finances .. . it was like trying to
siphon off the Gulf of Mexico with an eyedropper. For there were then ten mil-
lion people in Texas; if I worked sixteen hours a day and wasted no time, it would
have taken me some twenty-eight years to talk for one minute with every citizen in
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sively over television as well. However, in order to use television to
communicate with the large number of viewers the medium pro-
vides, a candidate must pay a price. Television time is expensive.'
The high cost of television is not a problem per se: "If all of the
money for political campaigning could come, let's say, from heaven,
and it was that pure, we would not object to its being spent in large
sums, because theoretically at least, political money is spent for
candidates to reach voters. That is what democracy is all about.""
The problem is how and from whom the money for television is
raised. 12  The donors who provide politicians the large sums of
money necessary for television are often the beneficiaries of im-
proper influence with a congressman, senator, or president. In
1968, for example, a wealthy New Yorker informed Democratic
presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey that he might receive fi-
nancial assistance if he modified his views on Vietnam. The po-
tential contributor said that he would grant Humphrey a private in-
terview with his group:
the state." Wright, Clean Money for Congress, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April 1, 1967,
at 100-01.
10. For instance, a one-minute network "spot" for a presidential candidate
during prime time in October, 1968, cost almost $50,000, not including the cost
of producing the spot. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 4, at
15-16.
11. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 434 (testimony of Philip M. Stern).
12. Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson offers some in-
sights into the origin of campaign funds: "Who buys this time? Where does the
money come from? Principally from the same corporations that buy all the other
television time. Roughly 90% of the political campaign funds in the United States
are provided by 1% of the people. And, for federal office, most of that 90% comes
from big business (and big labor). Why?
"Suppose, for example, you represent one of the corporations that receives over
$1 billion a year in Defense Department contracts. (The top 10 defense con-
tractors split $10.7 billion between them.) How much would it cost you to make
a modest campaign contribution to all elected federal officials? Let us assume a
contribution of $2,000 for every incumbent Congressman, $6,000 for every in-
cumbent Senator and $100,000 for each of the two major parties' candidates for
President. The total bill? A mere $585,000 a year. Assume a few additional
well-placed contributions of $50,000 to those 15 Congressmen and 10 Senators
who hold special power over your company-enough to bring the total to $1 mil-
lion a year. This is still an extraordinarily modest investment of 1/10 of 1% of
your annual return from the federal government. In fact, of course, no one cor-
poration needs to contribute to all Congressmen and Senators, so that the total
costs would actually be much lower." Hearings on H.R. 8627, H.R. 8628 (and re-
lated bills) Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 275 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 8627].
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We realize that you would like to have us become contributors toward your cam-
paign, but you should not expect an immediate decision from any of us, checkbook
in hand. If we become "turned on" . . . we have the capacity to give $1 million
or more to your campaign-and raise twice or three times that amount. But we will
each make our own individual judgments on the basis of how you answer our several
questions and how you conduct your campaign in the coming weeks. 13
Of course, most campaign financiers are more indirect in their at-
tempts to influence the candidate and in their expressions of what
they would like as a return on their "investment." There is, no
question, however, that regardless of the approach, large sums of
money contributed to a political campaign chest induce a special
sensitivity on the part of the candidate toward the donor. The
candidate and the contributor both know that a debt has to be
paid off, in one way or another, and when the special interests
prosper the public interest suffers. 14  Thus, the high costs of tele-
vision campaigning are detrimental in two respects: (1) potential
candidates are precluded from running for office because they
cannot raise the money required for an effective campaign; and
(2) those candidates who are successful in securing campaign
funds owe political debts to their backers which often can be
paid off only at the expense of the public.
In addition to the financial problems related to television campaign-
ing, the use of the medium as a campaign tool has engendered prob-
lems of its own. The television era is best suited for candidates with
certain attributes, which one commentator has described as follows:
These, then, are the qualities that the television era demands of political candi-
dates: personality above all else-a personality not too specific and not the least
abrasive, a personality which is pleasantly neutral enough to be built upon; a pleas-
ing appearance with no features which may light unflatteringly on television; as-
surance-a way of comporting yourself that suggests, with modesty, that you know
more about anything than anyone else and could handle any crisis; articulateness-
an ability to put anything you say, even if it is "I don't know what we're talking
about," in such a commanding and authoritative way that your grasp and leadership
qualities will flow through into every living room. In other words, you should be
an actor. 15
13. Alexander and Meyers, A Financial Landslide for the G.O.P., FORTUNE,
March, 1970, at 187.
14. As FCC Commissioner Johnson put it, "There is no way to raise millions
of dollars from big corporations for a campaign, and elect officials who will rep-
resent the people who are manipulated, oppressed, and employed by those cor-
porations." Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra note 12, at 298.
15. B. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE 162 (1972).
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Thus, candidates with certain qualities and abilities-none of
which are necessarily related to his ability to perform well in the
position he seeks-fare better in television campaigning than oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the same can be said of each campaign era in
our political history. Although the requirements for an effec-
tive television personality are different than those needed for other
mediums, it has not been shown that they are more deleterious to
political debate than "the bull-horn voice and chautauqua talents
that prospered in another era."16
Aside from the "television personality" problem, TV campaign-
ing raises other questions. Since television time is limited, how
should candidate access to TV be governed? Should all can-
didates get equal time? Should candidates be restricted in their use
of the medium?
Congress recently attempted to resolve some of these questions
as well as the problems resulting from the high cost of television.
On February 7, 1972, President Nixon signed the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 197111 into law. After briefly examining
previous campaign regulatory legislation, the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act will be discussed. The focus of this article will be on Title
I of the Act, known as the "Campaign Communications Reform
Act." The deficiencies of the Act itself will be noted, and more
comprehensive proposals for campaign communications reform will
be reviewed and evaluated.
I. CAMPAIGN REGULATORY LEGISLATION PRIOR TO THE ACT OF 1971
The major legislative efforts designed to prevent campaign fi-
nance abuses prior to 1971 were the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925"8 and the Hatch Act. 9
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act required every political com-
mittee to keep an account of all contributions and expenditures and
16. A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 400 (1960).
The same was true in other days, in the days of Franklin Roosevelt's radio
voice, of Theodore Roosevelt's boisterous phrase-making, of Thomas Jefferson's
agile pen. The types of persons equipped for successful political careers alter
with the changing requirements of campaigning. Id. at 407.
17. Act of Feb. 7, 1972, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (Supp. 1973).
18. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, Pub. L. No. 506, ch. 368, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070.
19. Hatch Act, ch. 410, §§ 1-8, 10-11, 13, 17, 19-24, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as
amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-613 (1970).
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to file the account with the Clerk of the House of Representatives
and the Secretary of the Senate 15 days before and 30 days after
an election. The Act provided that the accounts were to be held
open for public inspection. Under the campaign expenditure limits
of the Act, Senate candidates were permitted to spend $10,000
and House candidates $2,500, or each could spend three cents
times the number of voters in the previous election, with a maxi-
mum limit of $25,000 for a Senate candidate and $5,000 for a House
candidate.20  Another provision outlawed the direct or indirect
promise of an appointment or use of influence by a candidate in re-
turn for support of his candidacy. 2 Violations of any of these pro-
visions were punishable by a fine of $10,000 and two years impri-
sonment.22
The Hatch Political Activity Act of 1939, as, subsequently
amended, contained three significant provisions: (1) persons con-
tributing directly or indirectly more than $5,000 in one year to
a candidate for federal office would be fined not more than $6,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; (2) no political
committee could receive contributions of more than $3 million
or spend more than $3 million in one year; and (3) national
banks, corporations, and labor unions were prohibited from con-
tributing to any federal election.23
Both acts were poorly drafted. The monetary limitations were
feasible in 1925 and 1939, but the figures quickly became unrealis-
tic, and there was no provision for increases. In addition, as Presi-
dent Johnson observed, the regulations were "more loophole than
law,"24 and the loopholes were not hard to find.25
20. Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, § 309, 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), as amended
2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (Supp. 1973).
21. Id. § 310, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 599 (1948).
22. Id. § 314, as amended 2 U.S.C.A. § 252 (Supp. 1973).
23. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 608, 62 Stat. 723, as amended 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 608 (Supp. 1973); id. § 609, as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 608 (Supp. 1973);
id. § 610, as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp. 1973).
24. S. JouR., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1966) (message of President Johnson
to Congress).
25. The definition of a political committee, for instance, includes only those
committees operating in two or more states. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 591,
62 Stat. 719, as amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 591 (Supp. 1973). Thus, a candidate
had only to set up committees which functioned solely within one state to avoid
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Even the loopholes were insignificant, however, because the
laws themselves were not enforced. Although Congress has the
power to investigate the election of its own members,26 it is a power
that has not been utilized.27 The Justice Department has also consis-
tently ignored campaign finance violations, 28 thereby assuring can-
didates that they may safely do likewise.
The first congressional act to regulate political broadcasts be-
came law in 1927. The following standard was established in Sec-
tion 18 of the Radio Act:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station .... 29
This section was incorporated in the Federal Communications Act of
1934 ° as Section 315. It was not substantially altered until 1952,
when an amendment prohibited broadcasters from charging politi-
cal candidates higher rates than those charged other users.3" Fur-
ther amendments were added in 1959.32
the limitation. Similarly, the limitation on individual contributions to a political
committee could be avoided by giving $5,000 to a variety of political committees-
all, of course, channeling funds to the same candidate.
The 1970 senatorial campaign of Sen. James Buckley (R-N.Y.) is often cited as
an illustration of the use of "dummy" committees. By using a multitude of sep-
arate committees, the Buckley campaign was able to conceal the identities of per-
sons who contributed $400,000 to his campaign. In the words of Buckley's cam-
paign manager, David R. Vones, "We made a game out of it." "False Front"
Campaign Funds: How They Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 11, 1971,
at 57.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
27. The last serious congressional challenge based on campaign finance irregu-
larities occurred in 1927. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 4, at
48. Senate and House candidates often do not file the statements required by
law, but no action has ever been taken by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk
of the House to require compliance with the law. Hearings on S. 382, supra note
8, at 454.
28. For obvious reasons, no administration's Justice Department will enforce
the law against members of its own party, and, since in future years the other
party is likely to be in power, it will not enforce the law against the opposition
party since reprisals would undoubtedly be forthcoming once that party came
into office. Hopefully, Watergate will be an exception.
29. Radio Act, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (1927), as amended 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 315 (Supp. 1973).
30. Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as
amended 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (Supp. 1973).
31. Act of July 16, 1952, cl. 879, § 11, 66 Stat. 717, as amended 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 315 (Supp. 1973).
32. The 1959 amendments were enacted to overrule the FCC's Lar Daly deci-
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Section 315 requires broadcasters to provide equal opportunities
for all legally qualified candidates, regardless of their chances for
election. Broadcasters have long urged repeal of Section 315, ar-
guing that they cannot provide free television time to major party
candidates if they must also provide free time for a multitude of
minor party candidates."3 Opponents of repeal have argued that
sion. The Commission had ruled, 4-3, that Daly, a candidate for Mayor in Chi-
cago, was entitled to equal opportunities because Mayor Richard Daley had been
televised in a film clip shown in a regularly scheduled newscast. In re Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. (WBBM-TV), 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959). The amendments
exempted appearances of candidates on bona fide newscasts from Section 315 equal
opportunities.
Section 315 presently reads as follows: "(a) If any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the
use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candi-
date on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is inci-
dental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news docu-
mentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events, (including but not limited
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to
be use of a broadcast station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in
the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-
the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this Act to operate in the public interest and afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
"(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station for any of the
purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed the charges made for comparable
use of such station for other purposes.
"(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry
out the provisions of this section." Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, as amended 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (Supp. 1973).
33. The broadcasters' argument was made by CBS President Frank Stanton in
his appearance before the Subcommittee on Communications of the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee on March 4, 1963:
"A statutory device was contrived to impose on broadcasters a civic responsibil-
ity. The device backfired. Far from assuring the execution of that responsibility,
it created over the years a chronic situation which has had exactly the opposite
effect; it deprived broadcasters, by the unworkable, mathematically implausible
and substantively self-defeating equal time requirement, of an opportunity to carry
out their responsibility. By forcing them, in defiance of all dictates of relevance
and significance, to give equal time to the most trivial and irresponsible candi-
dates of the most bizarre parties, it forced them also to deny time to the busy and
distinguished men and women seriously aspiring to serve their nation, their states
and their communities." R. MAcNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE 282 (1972).
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the section is necessary, indicating that without it the prejudices of
station owners could be inflicted on unpopular candidates who would
have no effective recourse.34
In addition to Section 315, the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's "fairness doctrine" applies to political broadcasts. This doc-
trine, first enunciated in 1949,15 requires broadcasters to present
the basic points of view on all controversial issues of public impor-
tance. The doctrine requires only general balancing, however, and
it guarantees no automatic right of reply except in cases of per-
sonal attack, endorsement of a candidate in an editorial, and time
given to a political party.38
II. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
Pressure for campaign finance and broadcast reform mounted in
the late 1960's, 37 and in 1970 both the House and Senate passed a
reform bill.38  The legislation was vetoed by President Nixon, how-
ever, because he favored more "comprehensive" reform. 9
Reform measures were again introduced in Congress, and the
34. As one political consultant stated: "It seems to me particularly perilous
to leave in the hands of a station owner who frequently is the owner of a news-
paper in the town and a radio station and who frequently has very strong political
views of his own-to leave in his hands the decision about whether or not a candi-
date gets time." D. DUNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 104 (1971).
35. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
36. Thus, the fairness doctrine does not require that equal amounts of time
be given to the presentations of all views on a controversial issue, nor that par-
ticular spokesmen be given an opportunity to express their views.
37. The high cost of campaigning provided most of the impetus for reform.
The total cost of campaigning for all offices rose from $200 million in 1964 to
$300 million in 1968. See Alexander and Meyers, supra note 13, at 104.
38. S. 3637 would have permanently suspended the equal time requirement of
§ 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, in addition to establishing a ceiling on
the amount of money candidates for federal office could spend on radio and tele-
vision time. The bill also would have required stations to charge candidates at
their own established lowest unit rates for comparable commercial time. S. 3637,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
39. The President expressed the following reasons for his veto of the legisla-
tion: "S. 3637 does not limit the overall cost of campaigning. It merely limits
the amount that candidates can spend on radio and television. In doing so, it
unfairly endangers freedom of discussion, discriminates against the broadcast media,
favors the incumbent officeholder over the officeseeker and gives an unfair ad-
vantage to the famous. It raises the prospect of more-rather than less--cam-
paign spending." S. Doc. No. 109, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
590
POLITICAL BROADCAST REFORM
Senate passed a finance and broadcast reform bill on August 5,
1971.40 The House passed another version of the bill on Novem-
ber 30, 1971.41 Both houses agreed on a compromise bill which
emerged from the conference committee, 42 and on February 7,
1972, President Nixon signed the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 into law.
The Act contains four titles. Title I, known as the Campaign
Communications Reform Act, is the broadcast reform section of the
law. Title II amends the Hatch Act by repealing the limitations on
contributions and expenditures, by strengthening the prohibitions
on contributions by national banks, corporations, and labor unions,
and by limiting the amount that can be spent on a campaign from a
candidate's personal funds. Title III creates new standards for the
disclosure of campaign funds. Title IV mandates the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to promulgate regulations con-
cerning the extension of credit, without security, by a person
regulated by such Board or Commission to any candidate for fed-
eral office. Title IV also prohibits the use of funds appropriated for
the Office of Economic Opportunity to finance elections or voter
registration activity, and it repeals the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925.
The Campaign Communications Reform Act (Title I) contains
three significant provisions:
(1) During a 45 day period preceding a primary election and a
60 day period preceding a general election a broadcast station may
not charge a legally qualified candidate for any public office
a rate in excess of its "lowest unit charge . . . for the same class
40. S. 382 passed by a vote of 88 to 2. It would have repealed the equal time
requirement for presidential and vice-presidential candidates in primary and gen-
eral elections and set a spending limit of five cents times the number of the voting
age population for broadcast advertising and an equal amount for non-broadcast
advertising. A Federal Elections Commission would have been established under
the provisions of the bill to enforce disclosure regulations. 117 CONG. REC. S.
13301-302 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971).
41. The House bill did not include a repeal of § 315 and the House bill did not
establish an independent Elections Commission to supervise the campaign finance
regulations in the law. I U.S. CONG. & ADM. NEWS 138-39 (1972).
42. The conference committee agreed to strike the provisions in the Senate bill
repealing § 315 and establishing the independent Elections Commission. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
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and amount of time for the same period."4
(2) The Federal Communications Commission may revoke any
station's license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable
access to or permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the
use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."44
(3) Legally qualified candidates45 for federal elective office may
not exceed established spending limits in their use of communica-
tions media, defined as "broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities, and telephones."4 6  The limit is $50,
000, or 10 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the geo-
graphical area in which the election is held, whichever is greater.47
Furthermore, candidates may not spend more than 60 percent of their
total media expenditures on the broadcast media. 48  To insure that
the limits remain reasonable as inflationary price increases occur in
future years, the limits will be adjusted according to changes in the
Consumer Price Index.49
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION GUIDELINES
On March 16, 1972, the Federal Communications Commission re-
leased its guidelines for interpreting the provisions of Title I of the
Act. The guidelines outline commission policies in four areas:
(1) definition of a "legally qualified candidate;" (2) rates to be
charged for use of a station by candidates; (3) certifications that
stations are required to obtain from candidates; and (4) allowing
reasonable access to or permitting purchase of reasonable amounts
43. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(b)(1) (Supp. 1973),
amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
44. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 312(a)(7) (Supp. 1973),
amending 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1962).
45. Any person who "(A) meets the qualifications prescribed by the applicable
laws to hold the federal elective office for which he is a candidate, and (B) is
eligible under applicable State law to be voted for by the electorate directly or by
means of delegates or electors." Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 801(4) (Supp. 1973).
46. Id. § 801(1).
47. Id. § 803(a)(l)(A).
48. Id. § 803(a)(1)(B).
49. Id. § 803(a)(4).
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of time by candidates for federal elective office. The commis-
sion's guidelines in each of these areas will be examined to deter-
mine if congressional intent has been implemented.
A. LEGALLY QUALIFIED CANDIDATES
As defined in the Act, a legally qualified candidate is any per-
son who "(A) meets the qualifications prescribed by the applicable
laws to hold the Federal elective office for which he is a candidate,
and (B) is eligible under applicable State law to be voted for by the
electorate directly or by means of delegates or electors. 50
The commission's guidelines in this area are reasonable, and they
effectively implement the congressional design. For example, the
Act provides that a person who has made an expenditure for
the use of any communications medium on behalf of his candidacy
for the Presidency is a legally qualified candidate, even though no
public announcement of candidacy has been made. 1 A candi-
date, in other words, may not circumvent the law simply by delay-
ing an announcement of his candidacy. However, the Commission
has determined that the mere making of minimal expenditures does
not entitle a person to equal opportunities under Section 315(a)
-- other evidence of a genuine candidacy must be presented as well.
Thus, a station is not obligated to provide equal opportunities to
an individual who has purchased only one $5 ad in a newspaper un-
less other facts demonstrate that the candidacy is bona fide. 52
The Commission also indicates that the "lowest unit charge" pro-
vision does not apply to candidates "for nomination by a conven-
tion or caucus of a political party held to nominate a candidate."53
This determination is also reasonable; the express terms of the
Act are ". . . forty-five days preceding the date of a primary or
primary runoff election and during the sixty days preceding the date
of a general or special election . . . ."" (emphasis added). In addi-
tion to the fact that the Commission's interpretation complies with
50. Id. § 801(1).
51. Id. § 803(a)(3)(B).
52. 37 Fed. Reg. 5800 (1972).
53. Id.
54. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 316(b)(I) (Supp. 1973),
amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
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the clear congressional intent, it is doubtful that candidates would
elect to use television in a contest determined by the relatively
small groups of people participating in a caucus or convention.
B. LOWEST UNIT CHARGE
The Commission emphasizes that "lowest unit charge" means:
Candidates are entitled to discounts, frequency and otherwise, offered to the most
favored commercial advertiser for the same class and amount of time for the same
period, without regard to the frequency of use by the candidate. This includes dis-
count rates not published in a rate card but provided to commercial advertisers. 55
The lowest unit charge applies to the networks 6 if the price of
broadcasting time is lower on the date of use than when the contract
was made; in such a situation, the candidate would get a re-
bate (if he had already paid) or an adjustment (if the time had not
been paid for yet).57  If a station has unsold time available on a
particular date and provides a special low rate to an advertiser to
insure the sale of the time,"' that rate must be given to political
candidates.59 If a station provides for special low rates for adver-
tisers of long-standing, those rates must apply to candidates if they
are the lowest rates available. 60 If a station has "national" and "lo-
cal" rates, a candidate must be charged the lower of the two rates,
regardless of whether the station characterizes the candidacy as
"national" or "local."61
Thus, in these examples the Commission has made determina-
tions consistent with the congressional goal of providing access to
television for as many candidates as possible. It was the intent
of Congress to promote political communication over the airwaves
55. 37 Fed. Reg. 5800 (1972).
56. Id. at 5801.
57. Id.
58. Time is often sold at less than the going rate simply because it has not
been filled. As one network executive indicated: "If A&P has a batch of bananas
on Saturday and they aren't moving, they will lower the prices to get them out of
the store. They will be stale on Monday. The same thing is true for broadcasters.
If you have holes to fill on a ballgame, you get the rate down to try to get them
filled, even if the price was higher two weeks before. You don't want to get into
the program with unfilled time because it is lost if you do." D. DUNN, supra
note 34, at 48.
59. 37 Fed. Reg. 5801 (1972).
60. Id. at 5802.
61. Id. at 5802-03.
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rather than allow high costs to restrict such communication. 62 How-
ever, there are four determinations in this area which, while not un-
reasonable, should be changed in order to more effectively imple-
ment the congressional design.
First, the Commission has determined that the lowest unit charge
may vary with the day of the week on which a candidate uses a
station. 63  Congress, however, did not specifically allow this vari-
ation, and it clearly could have done so, as it did for "class," 4
"amount of time," 65 and "same period."6 6  To insure that candi-
dates actually receive the lowest unit charge, distinctions based on
the day of the week should be banned. As a consequence, can-
didates would be entitled to the lowest unit charge regardless of the
day: if the lowest unit charge for time on a particular station dur-
ing a particular time period occurred on a Tuesday, that same rate
would be charged to candidates even if they used time on a Friday
or a Saturday.
Second, the lowest unit charge provision applies only to time,
according to the Commission, and it does not apply to other
charges.67 Although Section 315(b) refers to the use by legally
qualified candidates "of any broadcast station"68 and does not
62. This intent was manifested by both the lowest unit charge provision and by
the provision requiring that stations provide candidates with "reasonable access."
63. "In computing the lowest unit charge ... stations, in addition to taking
into account the class and amount of time for the same period of the day, may
take into account the day of the week, if rates of the station vary with the day of
the week." 37 Fed. Reg. 5800 (1972).
64. "The term 'class' refers to rate categories such as fixed-position spots,
preemptible spots, run-of-schedule and special-rate packages." Id.
65. "The term 'amount of time' refers to the unit of time purchased, such as
30 seconds, 60 seconds, 5 minutes or 1 hour." Id.
66. "The term 'same period' refers to the period of the broadcast day such as
prime time, drive time, class A, class B or other classifications established by the
station." Id.
67. "The provision applies only to charges for purchase of time. It does not
cover additional charges made by a station for other services, which may be
termed production oriented, such as charges for use of a television studio, audio or
video-taping, or line charges and remote technical crew charges when the broadcast
is to be picked up outside the station. Moreover, the provision does not apply
to additional charges that might be incurred if a candidate sought to purchase full
sponsorship of an existing program for which there is an established program
charge in addition to a time charge." Id. at 5802.
68. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(b)(1) (Supp. 1973),
amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
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refer to "time," Section 315(b)(1) refers to the applicability of the
lowest unit charge for "the same class and amount of time." 9 (em-
phasis added). Therefore, the Commission's determination that the
lowest unit charge provision applies only to time is a reasonable
construction of the Act. Nevertheless, it should be changed. The
Commission could rule that candidates must also be charged the
lowest unit charge for related broadcast items, such as the use of a
television studio or audio or video-taping. Such a ruling would be
congruent with the congressional intent, as the purpose of the lowest
unit charge provision is to provide candidates with access to the
media which is as inexpensive as possible. If a station is required to
charge the lowest unit charge for broadcast time, but is permitted to
charge inflated rates for taping or for the use of its studio, the Act
is emasculated, and candidate access will be restricted rather than
promoted.
Third, if a state statute sets low rates for the carrying of legal
notices on broadcast stations, those low rates do not apply to candi-
dates.7" The Commission's reasoning for this deviation from the
guidelines is circular: "Since the rates for legal notices are set by
statute rather than by the station, they are not used for calculation
of the lowest unit charge for candidates."71 Presumably the Commis-
sion is wary of establishing, as the lowest unit charge, a rate which
has not been set by the station itself. However, if a state has de-
termined that it is in the public interest to permit legal notices to
be broadcast at low rates, surely the public interest would demand
that candidates' "political notices" be afforded equally low rates.
Fourth, the lowest unit charge for operators of cable television
will be determined by permitting the operators to "arrive at some
reasonable rate structure."72  Although this determination con-
cerning cable television is not crucial at the present time, it may be
important in future years.73 The lack of certainty as to what rates
69. Id.
70. 37 Fed. Reg. 5800 (1972).
71. Id.
72. Id. This assumes that the cable operator does not have an advertising
rate schedule. If he does, then the schedule's lowest unit rate will apply to
candidates.
73. Cable television will undoubtedly grow, and its growth will affect political
broadcasting. See, e.g., S. MICKELSON, supra note 5, at 272-80.
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cable operators may charge could have been remedied by specify-
ing that they may not charge rates in excess of those rates charged
by the broadcaster in the area with the highest "lowest unit
charge." Such a guideline would have insured that candidates' ac-
cess to cable television would not be impaired by higher rates than
those charged by commercial broadcasters.
C. CERTIFICATION
In order to insure compliance with the spending limitations for
communications media, stations and newspapers must receive a certi-
fication from a candidate indicating that an advertisement on the
station or in the newspaper will not result in a violation of the ex-
penditure limit.74  The Commission Guidelines outline suggested
procedures for stations to use in certifying the expenditures of candi-
dates on their facilities. The suggested procedures, however, are
not mandatory; the certification "need not be in any special form.
It may, for example, be incorporated into a standard contract or
start order."75
There is only one section of the Commission's suggested procedures
which should be changed to insure that congressional intent is imple-
mented. That section reads as follows:
Whenever a single use of a station is by or on behalf of two or more candidates for
elective office, the amount attributable to the expenditure of each candidate is the
amount agreed upon by the candidates in advance of the use and shown on the certi-
fication. In such situations, a joint certification, or individual certifications showing
the allocation to each candidate, should be furnished by joint users.1 6
If two opposing candidates appeared jointly on a program, the can-
didates would simply divide the cost equally. However, the Com-
mission's determination that candidates may decide for themselves
how they will apportion costs of joint appearances may create
problems if two or more candidates of the same party share broad-
cast time.
For example, if an incumbent President is likely to be reelected
easily, but a senatorial candidate from the President's party is run-
ning in an extremely close race, under the Commission's Guidelines,
74. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 803(b) (Supp. 1973),
75. 37 Fed. Reg. 5804 (1972).
76. Id.
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the two candidates could appear jointly on a program and devote vir-
tually all of the time to the senatorial race, although the President re-
mains on the screen throughout the telecast as a relatively silent
participant. The candidates could also agree that 90 percent of the
costs will be borne by the President and 10 percent of the costs
will be absorbed by the senatorial candidate. The result, of course,
is that the senatorial candidate gets additional exposure which the
law is intended to prohibit: the candidate might spend $100,000
on television time and, by participating in "joint" appearances paid
for by other candidates, receive $1,000,000 worth of television ex-
posure. His opponent, on the other hand, not fortunate enough to
have other candidates subsidize him, will only be able to get $100,-
000 worth of exposure.
Such a result is clearly not the intent of Congress, and a simple
revision in the guidelines will minimize the problem. The section
on joint appearances by candidates relating to certification require-
ments should be changed to read as follows:
Whenever a single use of a station is by or on behalf of two or more candidates for
elective office, the cost shall be divided equally among those candidates, and equal
amounts should be attributed to the expenditure certification of each candidate. In-
dividual certifications showing the allocation to each candidate should be furnished
by joint users.
By insuring that each candidate must share an equal burden of
the cost of a joint appearance, this revised guideline would elimi-
nate the potential gross abuses which could occur if candidates
were permitted to apportion the cost themselves. Abuses could oc-
cur under this revised guideline (with one candidate receiving ninety
percent of the exposure on a joint appearance and only paying
fifty percent of the cost), but they are not serious enough to
warrant an attempt to apportion costs by some complex formula
based on the number of minutes a candidate appeared, or the num-
ber of minutes a candidate spoke on a particular program.
D. REASONABLE ACCESS
The Commission guidelines in this area seek to clarify the obliga-
tions that stations must meet to provide candidates with "reasonable
access." 77 Most of the Commission determinations in this area are
77. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 312(a)(7) (Supp. 1973),
amending 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1962).
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reasonable interpretations of the Act. A station which refuses to
sell time for spots-ads of sixty seconds or less-may continue to
maintain such a policy as long as it offers reasonable access through
time periods of greater duration. 78  Charges made by non-commer-
cial educational stations and non-profit stations must "be reason-
able when viewed in the light of charges made by commercial sta-
tions in the same broadcast service licensed to serve the same com-
munity. ' 79  Stations do not have to give free time to fulfill their rea-
sonable access obligation.8" If a station refuses to sell reasonable
amounts of time, it "is required to give reasonable amounts of free
time." 81
In its major pronouncement on "reasonable access," however,
the Commission's guidelines are inappropriate. The key section, in
question and answer format, reads as follows:
Q. How is a licensee to comply with the requirement of section 312(a)(7) that he
give reasonable access to his station to, or permit the purchase of reasonable amounts
of time by, candidates for Federal elective office?
A. . . . Congress clearly did not intend, to take the extreme case, that during the
closing days of a campaign, stations should be required to accommodate requests for
political time to the exclusion of all or most other types of programming or adver-
tising. Important as an informed electorate is on our society, there are other ele-
ments in the public interest standard, and the public is entitled to other kinds of
programming than political. It was not intended that all or most time be preempted
for political broadcasts. The foregoing appears to be the only definite statement
that may be made about the new section, since no all-embracing standard can be
set. The test of whether a licensee has met the requirement of the new section is
one of reasonableness. The Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of
the licensee, but, rather, it will determine in any case that may arise whether the
licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith in fulfilling his obli-
gations under this section.8 2
It would be logical for a person reading this answer to assume
that the Commission was providing guidelines for a law that re-
stricted access for political candidates instead of encouraging it.
While perfunctorily acknowledging the importance of an "informed
electorate," the Commission minimizes the importance of political
access and emphasizes that "the public is entitled to other kinds




82. id. at 5804-05.
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of programming than political.""3  The Commission's interpretation
of "reasonable access" renders the phrase meaningless: "reason-
able access" will be presumed to be what a particular licensee says
it is.
Congress clearly intended "reasonable access" to mean that li-
censees have a positive responsibility to provide broadcast time to
political candidates. The FCC Guidelines should reinforce the im-
portance of that positive obligation instead of minimizing it. The
existing answer to the "reasonable access" question should be re-
placed with an answer similar to the following:
Congress clearly intended that political candidates be afforded access to the public
airwaves prior to an election. Since an election is the single most important po-
litical event in a society governed by elected representatives, broadcast stations can
serve no higher purpose than informing the electorate. Furthermore, since Federal
elections only occur every two years, the demands on stations to provide access will
not be unduly cumbersome. Consequently, political broadcast time should be granted
liberally prior to an election. Moreover, during the days immediately preceding an
election, a request for broadcast time from a political candidate will be presumed
to take precedence over regularly-scheduled programming. The Commission will
apply the aforementioned standard to determine in any case that may arise whether
the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith in fulfilling his
obligations under this section.
In addition to adopting a positive approach toward reasonable ac-
cess in the guidelines, the Commission should also adopt a rule which
prescribes a minimum standard which must be satisfied to fulfill a
reasonable access obligation under the law. The Commission's re-
luctant position on this matter was outlined by FCC Chairman Dean
Burch in testimony before a Senate subcommittee:
S. 956 contains a separate provision that would require the Commission to pre-
scribe rules and regulations to insure that reasonable amounts of broadcast time be
made available for political candidates. In its decisions and reports, the Commission
has consistently supported, enunciated and reaffirmed the concept of a reasonable
amount of time for political broadcasts as an important element of the licensee's
service to the public. We believe, however, that it would be unwise to attempt to
codify this standard in rules and regulations. Rather it is better to consider the li-
censee's performance in this area as one part, and an important part, of his entire
programming service to the public. We believe the amount of time afforded and the
campaigns to which time is devoted are matters best left to the licensee's reason-
able, good faith judgment based on his knowledge of his community's particular
needs.8 4'
83. Id. at 5804.
84. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 189.
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The fallacy of this point of view, of course, is that broadcasters
are motivated, like other businessmen, by profits. Political broad-
casts do not increase profits. Thus, if one station grants more ac-
cess than others in a particular area, it is "penalized" in the manner
which matters most to the broadcaster-the station's profits and
competitive advantage. As one New York broadcaster commented:
"We do give some time. We would give more if we had some as-
surance that our competitor wasn't beating our brains out at the
same time.""5  Thus, it is clear that access for political candidates
can be insured only by adopting a rule which applies to all broad-
casters. For example, the Commission might rule that each licensee
must grant access in prime time in the following amounts to fulfill
its minimum obligation under the "reasonable access" provision:
one-half hour to each candidate for the House of Representatives,"6
two hours for each candidate for the Senate, and four hours for each
candidate for President.17  The time minimums are aggregate
amounts, and candidates could divide the time into smaller periods.
The time would be provided during the month preceding the elec-
tion.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACT: ITS EFFECTS AND DEFICIENCIES
It is difficult to assess the impact of the Act at this early date.
The two complaints filed with the FCC under the "reasonable ac-
cess" provision of the Act are circumstantial evidence of compliance
with the law as interpreted by the guidelines.8 Assuming that loop-
holes are not discovered, the spending limitations on communica-
tions media should result in a sizable reduction in the amount of
85. R. MAcNEIL, supra note 2, at 286.
86. Since the number of stations per congressional district vary, one-half hour
seems the highest minimum that can reasonably be imposed. See note 171 and
accompanying text infra.
87. These would be aggregate amounts, and the stations should make reason-
able efforts to allocate time blocks suitable to the candidates ranging from five
minutes to one hour.
88. The FCC made two oral determinations under the Act in 1972. A can-
didate in New Mexico charged that a station refused to sell him any program
time, alleging that it was a violation of the licensee's duty to grant reasonable
access. The FCC agreed. Another candidate complained that a station would only
sell him seven spots during a week and that he wanted to buy eleven spots.
The FCC held that the station could limit the number of spots to seven. Inter-
view with Milton Gross, FCC Political Broadcast Bureau, Nov. 29, 1972.
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money spent by candidates on broadcasting and other media. 9 The
"lowest unit charge" provision should also result in greater access
for some candidates. The Act was a positive step toward campaign
communications reform," ° but its greatest deficiency is its lack of
comprehensiveness. In addition, however, the Act is deficient in a
number of specific respects.
Assuming that the limitation on media expenditures is constitu-
tional, 91 there are three problem areas relating to the limits. First,
89. Judging by the amounts spent by Senatorial candidates in 1970, the Act
would, on the average, decrease expenditures substantially: "Comparison between
actual amounts spent on broadcast media by Senatorial candidates in the 1970
general election and the permissible broadcast spending limitation applicable to
Senatorial candidates under Pub. L. No. 92-225." (the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971).
Individual Pub. L. No.
Candidate 92-225 Change
State 1970 Expenses 1972 Difference
Alaska 34,006 31,290 -2,716
Arizona 85,388 63,988 -21,400
Hawaii 64,954 31,290 -33,664
Indiana 353,012 181,847 -171,165
Missouri 231,518 168,027 -63,491
Nevada 73,788 31,290 -42,498
New Jersey 391,485 261,689 -129,796
New Mexico 35,451 31,290 -4,161
North Dakota 71,491 31,290 -40,201
Utah 115,312 31,290 -84,022
Vermont 69,668 31,290 -38,378
Wyoming 47,596 31,290 -16,306
The expenditures for candidates under Pub. L. No. 92-225 were determined by use
of the 50 percent allotment for broadcast advertising as allowed under § 104(a)(1)
(B) and includes an additional 4.3 percent to reflect inflationary increases."
Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for the Smoke-Filled Rooms?,
23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 659 (1972).
The 1972 campaign expenditures indicate that costs have significantly decreased:
"The Presidential-Vice Presidential campaigns accounted for $14.3 million of the 1972
total, a decline of 50% from the $28.5 million spent (on the nation's radio and
television network and stations and on cable television) in 1968. Candidates in U.S.
Senatorial races spent a total of $6.4 million in 1972, a 38% decline from
the $10.4 million spent in 1968." FCC, REPORT ON POLITICAL BROADCASTING AND
CABLECASTINO, PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS OF 1972 (March, 1973).
90. Even Senator Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), one of the bill's supporters, conceded
to his Senate colleagues: "Mr. President, we have not produced a great bill, but
we have produced a good bill." 117 CONG. REC. S. 21634 (daily ed. Dec. 14,
1971).
91. Some would argue that such a limitation is unconstitutional on its face
because: "[A] limit on what a candidate may spend is a limit on his political speech
as well as on the political speech of those who can no longer contribute money to
his campaign for effective use." Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 573 (state-
ment of Prof. Ralph Winter of Yale Law School). However, there has been a
limitation in effect for the past 47 years, and although it was never enforced, neither
was it ever declared unconstitutional.
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"equal" spending limits are inherently unequal because of the advan-
tage residing in the incumbent. The officeholder is able to uti-
lize thousands of dollars92 in his official capacity which-even if ad-
ditional purposes are served as well-serves as a campagn tool. Al-
though a remedy for this problem is difficult to devise and probably
impossible to implement,93 it should nevertheless be understood
that "equal" limitations serve to perpetuate incumbency.94
Second, the spending limitations on communications media are
constructed in terms of money: either $50,000 or 10 cents multi-
plied by the voting age population. Since media costs vary signifi-
cantly, a flat dollar limit allows candidates in some areas many
times the number of television appearances as candidates in other
areas. For example, a congressman from New York City could pur-
chase six 30-second spots under the formula provided in the Act,
while a congressman from Phoenix could purchase 144 such spots.95
92. A member of the House of Representatives is entitled to about $125,000
per year for salaries for a staff of about a dozen employees, $5,500 worth of new
or used office equipment, $3,000 per year for stationery, supplies, and printing,
35,000 minutes of long distance telephone time, 480,000 heavy duty brown en-
velopes per year, $700 worth of stamps per year, $2,400 for annual rental of
District office space, $2,400 for District office supplies. In addition, the Congress-
man is entitled to free and unlimited franked first class postage, a publication
allowance, the services of radio and television studios for the production of tapes
at low costs, travel allowances of one round trip home per month and three addi-
tional trips--one for himself and two for staff employees. He has access to various
government documents that he can mail free to constituents. These figures are
for the 91st Congress; they were even higher in the 92nd. Id. at 648-49 (testimony
of Prof. Howard R. Penniman of Georgetown University).
93. Since incumbents would be presented with "remedies" to problems which
benefit them, it is not likely that they will be anxious to act. One proposal, for
instance, would be to provide Congressional challengers with a franking privilege
for campaign literature. Such a plan would at least partially compensate for
the advantages of incumbency, and, because of that, it will not be enacted.
94. Setting limitations on campaign expenditures that apply "equally" to the
incumbent and to the challenger fails to take into account the advantages of the
subsidization of the incumbent and the more severe the limit the greater the
handicap placed on the challenger. Money for campaigning does not assure a
real contest, but tight limitations on funds may distort the democratic process by
reducing the opportunity for a serious challenge to the entrenched officeholder.
Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 649.
95. As Senator Marlow Cook (R-Ky.) observed: "Thirty-second spots in New
York City, for instance, cost $4,800. In Los Angeles they cost $2,900. In At-
lanta they cost $700. In Dallas $550. In Phoenix, $200." Id. at 658. Thus,
with a broadcast limitation of six cents per voter, a New York City Congressman
could purchase only 1/24 the amount of time which could be bought by a Phoenix
Congressman.
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Some means should be devised to standardize the limitations in
terms of broadcast time instead of dollars, thus affording all candi-
dates similar access to the broadcast media.9 6
Third, as the FCC Guidelines emphasize, the media limitations for
radio and television apply to the purchase of time only; production
costs are not included. As a consequence, costs may be hidden in-
stead of reduced: ". . . you will get simply more and more and
more sophisticated polling and tape production and so forth and the
competition . . will be in these hidden costs to the consultants and
in the quality and nature of produced materials. ' 97  The Act should
have been drafted to cover production costs as well as costs for
broadcast time.
Finally, the enforcement provisions of the Act are deficient in
two respects. First, since the Clerk of the House and the Secretary
of the Senate supervise the reports completed by congressmen and
senators,98 the regulators are elected by those whom they pre-
sumably are to regulate. Obviously, this is not a procedure which
will promote confidence in strict and impartial enforcement of the
law. 9 Instead, the Act should have provided for an impartial Elec-
tions Commission to act in a supervisory capacity.
Second, to enforce the spending limitations on communications
media, the Congress designed a virtually foolproof procedure: be-
fore a candidate may purchase time on television or radio, or pur-
chase an ad in a newspaper, he must certify that the expenditure
96. Under such a plan Congressional candidates from New York City should
be entitled to greater amounts of time. The danger, however, is that if the limit
is very high, the costs of campaigning to the limit will also be. high. Thus, the
dilemma may not be resolvable without some kind of subsidization for political
broadcast time.
97. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 618 (testimony of Prof. David Adamany
of Wesleyan University).
98. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(g) (Supp. 1973).
99. "For decades the Secretary [of the Senate] and the Clerk [of the House]
have been filing officers under the existing federal statutes. In these decades a
pattern has been created of accepting reports without question and simply mak-
ing them available to the public. I do not believe that a change in the statutory
rules will change the deeply ingrained view that the Secretary and the Clerk are
mere filing officers. An Elections Commission, on the other hand, because it is
freshly created, would be more likely dramatically to alter the reporting forms
effectively to obtain information. It would also because of its bi-partisan com-
position, be more likely to investigate thoroughly and report violations in the re-




will not result in a violation of the law.' 0 This certification sys-
tem effectively eliminates the traditional practice of using "dummy"
committees to avoid spending limitations."0 This is the toughest,
most admirable aspect of the new Act-the certification provision
was a genuine and successful attempt to plug the gaping loophole
that existed in previous spending limitation laws. Unfortunately,
though, the Act plugs more than loopholes. By insuring that
"dummy" committees cannot be used by candidates to circumvent
the limitations, Congress has simultaneously insured that legitimate
committees and organizations are rendered mute prior to an elec-
tion as well, unless a candidate is willing to have an organization's
ad costs charged to his spending limitation. In effect, the Act grants
veto power to the candidate during a campaign. Even groups which
support a particular candidate may be denied an opportunity to air
their views, because "It]here may be groups whose support [a can-
didate] would find embarrassing, either because of the composition
(e.g., extreme leftists) or because of the nature of their message
('We really don't trust him but he's the best of a bad lot')."'0 2
This problem was recognized throughout the Senate and House
hearings on the Act. As Senator Pastore observed:
There are a lot of people who are interested in politics and a lot of people are in-
terested in issues. You have all kinds of organizations. You have the broadcasting
organization. You have the Chamber of Commerce. You have the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers. You have COPE. You have a lot of things.
Now, how in the world are you going to compel these people to keep silent during
a campaign if they feel the welfare of America is involved? I do not see how you
can do it. How can you compel them to go to the candidate and say "I want to put
an ad in the paper?" How can you circumscribe a man's fundamental right to speak
out on an issue if this country is his?103
Senator Pastore's questions were never resolved.'0 4 Apparently
realizing that the media limitations would be meaningless without
a certification procedure,' 0 ' Congress chose to enact a tough law de-
100. Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 803(b) (Supp. 1973).
101. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 591 (Supp.
1973), formerly ch. 645, § 591, 62 Stat. 719 (1948).
102. Rosenthal, High-Cost Primaries, NEw REPUBLIC, June 19, 1971, at 7-8.
103. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 634.
104. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra note 12, at 105, 144, 255.
105. As Rep. Louis Frey (R-Fla.) pointed out during hearings on the legisla-
tion, there will be ". . . loopholes in the legislation if we don't do this. Take the
practical issue of the war and the differences of opinion we have today. If both
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spite the existence of extremely serious first amendment problems.
As a consequence, the Act's constitutionality is now being tested in
the courts by the American Civil Liberties Union.'
There is no totally satisfactory means of resolving this dilemma.
The priorities for minimizing the influence of money in our elec-
toral process and for encouraging the widest spectrum of speech pos-
sible during a campaign are extremely high, and yet the two goals
appear to be mutually exclusive. Instead of totally abandoning ei-
ther goal, however, perhaps there is a way to substantially salvage
both.
The certification requirement should not apply to genuine issue
committees, since it clearly abridges freedom of speech, and it does
so at a crucial moment-immediately prior to an election. The
problem of "dummy" committees could be diminished by insuring
that candidates have the right to judicial relief: if a candidate can
demonstrate that a committee has been organized on behalf of his op-
ponent, and has been presenting "issues" only incidentally for the
purpose of assisting his opponent, he should be entitled to a court
injunction which places the committee's expenditures among the
other media expenditures made by the opposing candidate. Free
speech would not be restricted, but blatant attempts by candidates
to form "issue" committees would be detected and remedied. Even
so, two problems still must be acknowledged: (1) genuine issue
committees may still contribute to a candidate's media exposure,
giving him an edge over an opponent; and (2) sophisticated attempts
by candidates to set up "dummy" committees would probably be
successful. 0 7 Recognizing these two remaining problems, such
candidates A and B were limited to $60,000 or 7 cents a vote, and I was on one
side or the other, I could see organizing some groups in my area to raise money,
not particularly for me, necessarily but for whatever point of view I espoused
through the campaign, and doubling or tripling or quadrupling the money and hit-
ting on that theme time after time, and in effect, doing away with a practical limi-
tation on spending." Id. at 106.
106. The ACLU filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia on Oct. 2, 1972, alleging that the Act is unconstitutional. The ACLU at-
tempted to place an ad in the Sept. 20, 1972, edition of the New York Times to attack
President Nixon's support of legislation designed to curb school busing, and listed
102 Congressmen who voted against the bill as deserving support. The Times
rejected the ad because the ACLU failed to provide the certification documents
required by the Federal Election Campaign Act, § 104(b). ACLU Sues Over
Rejection of Ad Against Nixon, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1972, at A12, col. 4.
107. For instance, an incumbent Senator facing election in 6 years might
[Vol. XXII:582
POLITICAL BROADCAST REFORM
an approach is still superior to that provided in the Act, or to that
which existed prior to the Act.
V. MORE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS FOR CAMPAIGN
COMMUNICATIONS REFORM
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was a limited re-
form measure. A number of proposals for more comprehensive
reform have been advanced, and some of them will be examined in
this section. Four basic areas of reform will be discussed: (1)
Should broadcasting formats be regulated for candidates? Specifi-
cally, should spot advertisements (messages of 60 seconds or less)
be banned? (2) How should broadcasting time be allocated among
candidates? Specifically, should the "equal time" provision be
eliminated or modified to allow broadcasters to grant time to ma-
jor candidates without affording equal time to minor candidates?
(3) What obligation do licensees have to provide free time for po-
litical candidates? Specifically, should candidates be granted time
free of charge with the costs paid by broadcasters or the federal
government (or a combination of the two)? (4) What is the best
method for financing campaigns? Specifically, should part or all
of candidates' campaign expenditures be financed by the federal gov-
ernment?
A. BROADCAST FORMAT REGULATION: SHOULD SPOTS BE BANNED?
Political candidates are not restricted in their use of television to-
day. They may produce an advertisement of any length desired;
they may choose to debate an opponent, or they may decide to show
a political biography on film. They may appeal to the viewer's in-
tellect, or they may appeal to his emotions. They may speak to the
voters about the issues, or they may simply establish a desired image.
They may fairly present the opponent's views, or they may distort
them. Although regulating the content of political speech would
clearly be unconstitutional, reformers have argued that regulating
the format of such speech on television is both constitutional and de-
sirable.' 08 The regulation most widely called for is the prohibition
immediately establish an "issue" committee which would continue to function
throughout his term, stepping up its efforts during his next campaign.
108. Because television time is a limited commodity, and since the airwaves are
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of the political spot.1"9
The spot has become the most widely used 110 and controversial
aspect of political broadcasting. 1 ' Since spots are messages lasting
no more than 60 seconds (and often only 10), they are particu-
larly susceptible to abuse. Many spots are simply inane, conveying
no substantive information to the viewer." 2  However, critics are
primarily concerned about spots which "employ insidious associa-
tions of images and ideas designed, like a malign post-hypnotic sug-
gestion, to implant a lasting if irrational repugnance for the opposi-
tion."11 8  The most frequently cited example of such an abusive spot
occurred in the 1964 Presidential campaign:
At 10 p.m. on Monday, September 7, millions of Americans were watching NBC's
Monday Night at the Movies. There was a break for station identification; then on
came a film of a pretty little girl pulling the petals off a daisy and counting them
slowly. As she counted, a man's voice came in over hers, also counting: ". . . ten,
owned by the public, television is regulated in the public interest. Thus, regu-
lating the format for television is not considered to be violative of the first
amendment by reformers. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, the
amount of time, in terms of its cost, is limited. In other reform proposals, such as
those made in the Twentieth Century Fund Report, candidates would be re-
quired to make substantially live appearances to qualify for reduced or free time.
109. FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson thinks the spot is immoral and
should be forbidden. More surprising is the fact that the advertising agencies of
Young and Rubicam and Foote, Cone, and Belding have publicly denounced spots,
and refuse to produce them. According to Edward Ney of Young and Rubicam,
"It is a perversion of our skills to attempt to use the techniques of a 30-second or
60-second commercial to discuss an issue or the character of a candidate for high
political office. We believe that such advertising should not be allowed on the
air." Navasky, The Making of the Candidate, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1972, (Maga-
zine) at 84, 89.
110. "It is recognized . . . that 90 percent of the money goes to that part
[spots] of advertising." Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 339 (statement of
Senator Vance Hartke).
The first political spot was apparently produced in 1936 and performed on radio
when Republican Presidential candidate Alf Landon had an ad aired by the ad-
vertising firm of Blackett, Sample and Hummert. The controversy over spots
has been most intense in recent years, however, as their use of television has be-
come more frequent and more sophisticated.
111. See, e.g., supra note 109.
112. John O'Toole, president of Foote, Cone, and Belding, has produced a 20-
minute presentation with samples of old political spots which say nothing at all:
"J.F.K.'s 'It's Up to You' spot, which made the point that it's up to you; Nixon's
'Nixon's the One' spot, which argued that Nixon's the one; and Robert Taft Jr.'s
'One Man Who Can Win' spot, which contended that Taft was one man who could
win almost as firmly as Agnew's 'My Kind of Man' spot asserts that Agnew is my
kind of man." Navasky, supra note 109, at 89.
113. Porter, Did You Know Ronald Reagan Shot Lincoln?, Wash. Post, Jan.
23, 1972.
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nine, eight, seven ...... As he finished, the scene dissolved into the explosion of
a nuclear bomb and an announcer's voice urged listeners to support Johnson and the
Democratic ticket.1 14
There are numerous other examples of political spots which have
grossly distorted the issues and the views of opposing candidates."'
Moreover, spots are directed at the most uninformed, politically
disinterested segment of the electorate." 6 The mass television au-
dience is a group with "weak political motivation and is not gen-
erally well-informed. It does not care much about politics and for
that reason will believe what it is told. The audience contains that
group which makes its voting decisions very late." 117
Nevertheless, those who oppose an abolition of spots argue, cor-
rectly, that spots are not inherently demagogic or even superfi-
cial.118  In fact, intelligent, substantive spots have been produced
by a number of candidates." 9  Furthermore, spots can be utilized
114. R. MAcNEIL, supra note 2, at 205.
115. In 1952, the Stevenson campaign committee, without the candidate's
knowledge, produced the following spot: ". . . I don't like generals for President.
Twenty years ago the Germans had a general for a President whose name was
von Hindenburg and then Hitler moved in and took over the country. No thank
you, general .. . I'll stick with a man with experience in government. I'll stick
with Adlai Stevenson." Porter, supra note 113.
Such ads are not solely the products of Presidential candidates. In Governor Pat
Brown's campaign against Ronald Reagan, "[o]ne of [his] spots even said, 'Remem-
ber, it was an actor who shot Abraham Lincoln.'" R. MACNEIL, supra note 2, at 215.
Usually, however, the distortion is not so obviously detectable by the average
voter. In Governor Nelson Rockefeller's campaign for re-election in New York,
the following spot was aired about his opponent: "Frank O'Connor, the man
who led the fight against the New York Thruway, is running for Governor.
Get in your car. Drive down to the polls and vote." In fact, what Frank
O'Connor, then a state legislator, had opposed was the Republican-backed toll-
road. O'Connor and the Democrats in Albany wanted a free road. Id.
116. According to Richard Scammon of the Election Research Center: "The
Lower Middle Class make up their minds late and therefore are most subject to
influence by television." According to Herbert Gans, the lower middle class is
the mass TV audience. Id. at 224.
117. Id.
118. When a reporter asked media consultant Joe Napolitan if it was possible
to make a serious and useful statement in 60 seconds or less, he replied: "'If
elected I will unilaterally withdraw all our troops from Vietnam within three
months of election day.' 'I will go to Korea.' 'Will you marry me?' 'I love you.'
Navasky, supra note 109, at 89.
119. As Russell Hemenway of the National Committee for an Effective Con-
gress testified at hearings on the Federal Election Campaign Act: "We brought a
series otf spot announcements down here at the invitation of Senator Pastore.
Many members of the subcommittee looked at them. They included the political
advertising of Senator Javits, Mayor Lindsay, Senator Robert Kennedy, and others,
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to raise campaign funds, to reach voters who would not watch a
longer political message,"' and to enable a challenger to establish
the name-recognition necessary to have a chance against a well-
known incumbent opponent.'21
Even so, spots are consistent and effective vehicles for abuse, and
the political process would be improved if spots were banned-par-
ticularly if it were done in the context of more comprehensive re-
form.' 22 However, a total ban would raise serious constitutional
questions, and there are few prospects for such a ban at the present
time. 113  To encourage the responsible use of the airwaves without a
total ban, a number of steps could be taken.
all of them designed for New York State, which included both the large concen-
trated metropolitan district of New York plus upstate New York which is very
thinly populated.
"They all expressed amazement at the amount of content that you can put into a
one-minute spot.
"Now, you can either use broadcasting intelligently, as these candidates did, or
you can use it to distort an issue or a personality." Hearings on S. 382, supra
note 8, at 208 (testimony of Russell Hemenway).
120. "It is the ability of the spot to hold the audience, though, that makes it
most attractive to advertising strategists. Carroll Newton once pointed out that
the thirty-minute set political speeches achieved average ratings 34 percent below
the programs they replaced. Fifteen-minute political programs, he added, lost an
average of 24 percent, and five-minute political programs between 5-10 percent. In
contrast, the 60-second commercial spot showed no loss. In view of the fact that
the political campaigner must constantly try to win over the uncommitted, or
supporters of the other side, the advantages of the spot are clear." S. MICKELSON,
supra note 5, at 62.
121. Russell Hemenway of the National Committee for an Effective Congress
emphasized the importance of name-recognition: "May I suggest to you again
that the person against whom your suggestion [to limit or eliminate spots] would
work most severely is the challenger to a political office. He is the person who
must make himself known, he is the person who is unknown. You as the incum-
bent have tremendous advantage, the use of your office, staff, frank, all other
advantages that incumbents have. Challengers don't have this. They are also
mainly unknown personalities." Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 210.
122. While distortions can obviously be made in half-hour programs as well as
10-second spots, it is much more difficult for candidates to produce longer pro-
grams without including substantive matter. It must be conceded, however, that a
ban or limitation on spots would probably not result in a drastic improvement in
political broadcasting if enacted without additional reforms.
123. See, e.g., Memorandum of the General Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, On the Legality of Establishing Minimum Time Durations for Politi-
cal Broadcasts: ". . . the proposal to limit political broadcasts to those which
last at least a specified number of minutes raises serious Constitutional problems,
and would probably be in conflict with the First Amendment." Hearings on S.
382, supra note 8, at 588-91.
"There is very little sympathy among the incumbents for disallowing spot an-
nouncements." Id. (statement of Russell Hemenway). In fact, Senators Hartke
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First, broadcast stations should be required to make time periods
longer than one minute available to candidates. The fact is that
many stations only offer spots to candidates. 124  If candidates are
able to secure longer periods of time, they may be willing to do so.
Second, financial incentives should be provided to encourage can-
didates to purchase time in larger blocks. One sensible proposal
has been advocated by communications consultants Robert and Jane
Squier:
Candidates . . . who . . . feel that their most effective way of communicating with
the voters is through product-oriented advertising, should be allowed to do so. They
should, in our view, have to pay the same price that manufacturers pay in order to
market their products. . . . But if they make the decision to present their case in
program-length appeals, we feel they should be encouraged to do this either at dras-
tically reduced rates or free of charge. We would, in effect, be subsidizing a sys-
tem which would encourage candidates to use this more responsible channel of com-
munication.12 5
Third, efforts could be made-particularly by the two major par-
ties-to establish a political broadcasting code of ethics. Such a
code should not be enacted into law, since it would pose freedom of
speech and censorship problems which, if not insurmountable,
would be undesirable. However, if candidates can agree among
themselves to abide by a minimum set of ground rules for broadcast
campaigning, the public (and the parties and candidates) would
benefit. 121
and Stevenson introduced an amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 to ban the purchase by federal candidates of television segments less than
60 seconds in length. The amendment was quickly tabled, as most Senators
shared the views of Senator Gravel (D-Alaska): "I think it is legislative arro-
gance to think in terms of outlawing something which is a method of communica-
tion. We are not prepared to say whether a message should not be put out in less
than 1 minute. Let us have freedom to do it. It is like saying, 'Henceforth, you
have to advertise only in English.' Suppose I wanted to communicate with some
people in Polish. Suppose I wanted to communicate with some people in Ger-
man. Why should that be legislated against? This would be an error which
would become obvious 6 months or so from now." 117 CoNG. REC. S. 13145
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971). Of course, a candidate does not have freedom now to
choose numerous methods of communication, i.e., a 5-second ad, or a 2-hour ad.
124. Because stations do not want to disrupt their schedules, spots are the
most convenient blocks of time to sell-larger blocks tend to cut into scheduled
programming. Between 1964 and 1970, the percentage of total broadcasting money
by candidates used for spots of 60 seconds or less rose from 81 to 95 percent.
117 CONG. REc. S. 13141 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971).
125. Squier and Squier, TV in Election Campaigns-A Call for Changes, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 27, 1972, at 84, 85.
126. An example of such a code was proposed by former FCC Commissioner
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B. ALLOCATION OF BROADCAST TIME: SHOULD SECTION
315 BE REPEALED?
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 did not alter Section
315 of the Communications Act of 1934. 127 Section 315 provides
that broadcasters must afford equal opportunities to all candidates in
a particular race.128 Broadcasters have argued for many years that
the section impedes their coverage of political campaigns, since the
grant of time to a major party candidate is a simultaneous com-
mitment of time to candidates of minor parties. 129 The statistics
belie that contention, however; stations have not been more generous
with free time in elections with only two candidates than they have
been in races with a number of contenders.130
Nevertheless, the broadcasters' view is not without some merit.
In a typical presidential election year there are at least a dozen can-
didates, and there have been elections for the Senate with as many as
Paul Porter. In addition to banning spots, Porter proposes the following: "Broad-
casters should reject all political advertising which contains film clips, pictures or
tape recordings of the opposing candidate, unless such opposition candidate is
given an opportunity in advance to view the material and prepare an appropriate
reply to be broadcast simultaneously.
"Dramatizations of political issues should be prohibited.
"Disparaging attacks upon a political candidate should not be permitted except
when personally made by an opposing candidate.
"No new political material should be accepted by any broadcaster during the last
8 hours of the campaign." Porter, supra note 113.
Such guidelines should not be imposed on candidates, however, because of the
dangers of censorship: ". . . granting the government permission to keep from the
public political appeals which it deems confusing, irrational, or irrelevant is a
dangerous invitation to censorship." Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the
First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 900, 911 (1971).
127. See Communications Act ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as
amended 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (Supp. 1973).
128. Id.
129. See, supra note 33.
130. For example, there were only two candidates in 20 of the 34 Senate
races in 1964, and no minor candidates therefore would have been entitled to
free time. Nevertheless, only 29 percent of the television stations involved in
those races offered free time-the same percentage that offered time in multi-candi-
date races. D. ROSENBLOOM, ELECTING CONGRESS-THE FINANCIAL DILEMMA
78 (1970).
In 1968, only 34 percent of the stations in areas serving election contests with
only two candidates offered free time. In the seven states with multi-candidate
races, however, 45 percent of the stations gave free time. FCC SURVEY OF POLITICAL
BROADCASTING--PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS OF 1968, at 3 (1969).
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71 candidates.' Providing free time to such large numbers of can-
didates is concededly a demanding task, and one which the broad-
casters do not wish to bear. Consequently, numerous proposals
for the repeal or alteration of Section 315 have been advanced. The
stated purpose of such proposals is to encourage and allow for in-
creased amounts of time for major party candidates. There are
seven basic types of proposals.
1. Repeal Section 315 for all elections.
This proposal is a simple one, calling for the total repeal of the
equal opportunities requirement. If Section 315 were to be repealed,
individual broadcasting stations would have complete discretion in
providing time for candidates. 3 2  There would be no assurance of
fair treatment for all candidates.' Even assuming that local sta-
tions would be scrupulously fair with Democratic and Republican
candidates (a dangerous assumption),3 4 it is probable that the sta-
tions would snub legitimate minor party candidates as well as any
candidates thought to have little chance of winning. 33 The fair-
131. Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra note 12, at 250. There are often numerous
candidates for minor offices as well. In 1952, for instance, there were 72 candi-
dates for Milwaukee County Sheriff. Hearings on Communications Act Amend-
ments Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 74, 189 (1956).
132. See note 34 supra.
133. In many Western states, statewide candidates need the protection of
§ 315, according to Senator Ted Stevens (D-Alaska): "We have local candidates,
people from city council, mayor, county, or borough governments, State legisla-
tures, everyone using the air media on these isolated stations that are not state-
wide. If it were not for the equal time provision, the statewide candidates
wouldn't be able to buy any time." Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 176.
134. See note 34 supra.
135. The records of the free time that national radio and television networks
granted to minor party presidential candidates during the last four general elec-
tions partially substantiate the fear that suspending Section 315 would reduce the
amount of time received by those candidates. Between 1956 and 1960 the
amount of time granted minor party candidates fell dramatically. Of course, these
office seekers fared no better in 1964, when Section 315 was operative, than they
did in 1960, when it was not. But they did receive more time in both 1956 and
1968, when the equal time rule prevailed, than they did in 1960. There is thus a
high probability that broadcasters would provide less time to Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates representing minor parties if Section 315 were suspended
than they would when it is operative. D. DUNN, supra note 32, at 102.
The situation is compounded by the fact that minor party candidates are ig-
nored by the newspapers and refused by others-such as printers and billboard
dealers-and have no means of access to voters but television. id. at 104.
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ness doctrine would not offer such candidates adequate protection,' 8"
and even if it did, there would be no effective way for the FCC to
monitor the thousands of stations and thousands of races involved. 137
In short, "the potential for abuse makes the risk too great to
take.'
13 8
2. Repeal Section 315 for Presidential elections only.
The National Committee for an Effective Congress supports this
proposal, believing that "the high visibility of presidential candidates
minimizes the risk of unfair treatment."' 39  That is undoubtedly
true-for the major party candidates. The risks of abuse are sub-
stantially less when repeal is confined to one national, highly-pub-
licized contest than when repeal extends to all races and candidates;
the major networks would undoubtedly grant equal opportunities to
the Democratic and Republican nominees even without a legal re-
quirement to do so. The problem would be the networks' and sta-
tions' treatment of third, fourth, and fifth party candidates: in-
deed, the repeal of Section 315 is advocated for the express purpose
of allowing broadcasters to ignore minor party candidates.
Thus, the two major parties would get national exposure at the
expense of other parties. Yet minor parties have had considerable
impact on American political history; minor party platforms fre-
quently become major party platforms within several decades. It is
the minor party candidates who most need television to communi-
cate their programs--often radically different from those advanced
136. As Rep. Torbert MacDonald (D-Mass.) indicated in floor debate on the
Act: ". . . anybody who tries to pull a rabbit out of the hat and say that the
fairness doctrine is going to protect candidates for office just does not understand
the fairness doctrine. In the first place, 315, the equal time provision, is law,
and the fairness doctrine is merely a rule. The fairness doctrine does not go to
political debates. It covers controversial issues." 117 CONG. REC. H. 11435
(daily ed. Nov. 29, 1971).
137. "Presidential contests are unique. They engage the attention of the entire
country, and are subject to the scrutiny of a national constituency which would be
quick to rise at any indication of unfair treatment. Candidates in intrastate cam-
paigns lack such protection, and by virtue of their sheer numbers-468 House and
Senate races alone-would pose a herculean, and probably impossible, task for
any watchdog agency. Such candidates would inevitably be more subject to the
whims of individual stations and local pressures." Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra





by the major party candidates. As Chief Justice Warren stated in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire:
All political ideas cannot and should not be channelled into the programs of our
two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by mi-
nority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of demo-
cratic thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted . . . . The absence of
such voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our society.
14 0
Since the repeal of Section 315 for presidential candidates would in-
evitably stifle the voices of minor party candidates, this proposal
should be rejected.
3. Add an additional exemption to Section 315.
Under this proposal, a fifth exempt category would be established
for Section 315: "bona fide news programs in which at least two
candidates appear in debate or back-to-back discussion of issues to
be specified by the licensee."'' Individual stations would have
wide discretion in choosing the candidates who appear as well as the
format of the program. Similar to the two proposals previously
discussed, this proposal is undesirable because it places too much
authority in the hands of the licensee and provides no assurance
to minor party candidates that they will be afforded access.
4. Restrict the applicability of Section 315 to a limited period prior
to the election.
Except during an eight-week period prior to a general election and
a four-week period prior to a primary election, Section 315 would
be repealed.' 42 During those time periods, however, 315 would be
fully applicable. If campaigns are begun prior to this period,
"broadcasters will have the opportunity to give major candidates ad-
ditional coverage, thus supplying the public with beneficial informa-
tion.""' 3 This proposal would provide minor party candidates with
protection during the final weeks of a campaign, and in that respect
is superior to the three previously examined. Nevertheless, during
140. 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957).
141. See Geller, Political Broadcasts-A Few Short Steps Forward, 20 CATH.
L. REV. 449, 454 (1971).
142. See Campaign Radio-TV $40 million, BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1964, at 23.
143. Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal, 3 HARV. J. LEGis. 257, 275
(1966).
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the periods when Section 315 is not applicable, minor party candi-
dates would have no protection."' In addition, major party can-
didates would undoubtedly campaign more heavily during the period
when Section 315 is not applicable, thus increasing the length of cam-
paigns.
5. Suspend Section 315 during a limited period prior to the elec-
tion.
This proposal is the reverse of the previously examined plan: mi-
nor party candidates would be protected except during the final
weeks of the campaign. This proposal would encourage the short-
ening of campaigns, since the major party candidates would use
broadcast time only during the period in which Section 315 does not
apply. However, the equal opportunities requirement is removed at
the most crucial time for candidates and parties-the time prior to
the election, when most Americans are more receptive to political
messages and political persuasion.145 Thus, minor party candi-
dates would not have an opportunity to communicate during the
time when communication is vital.
6. Repeal Section 315, and require equal opportunities for major
party candidates and "proportionate" opportunities for minor party
candidates.
One of the proponents of this concept, Dr. Herbert Alexander
of the Citizens' Research Foundation, explains the proposal:
I am in favor of a formula for "differential equality of access" in which major
candidates get "equal time," minor candidates get "equal time," but minors get
less than majors. This formula could be applied to candidates for other offices as
well as President, and would protect all candidates, major and minor. 146
Such a formula is more appealing than the previously examined
proposals in that minor party candidates are guaranteed some ac-
cess.' 4 7 In fact, it is argued that minor parties might be amenable
144. See note 137 supra.
145. See note 117 supra.
146. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 645 (testimony of Dr. Herbert E.
Alexander).
147. However, not even all minor party candidates would be guaranteed some
access--certain standards would have to be satisfied to receive minimal access.
See note 146 supra.
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to proportionate time requirements. 4 8  Nevertheless, the dangers
inherent in such a plan are manifest in the specific proposals for pro-
portionate amounts of time: only the Democratic and Republican
parties are deemed "major," and minor parties receive only a small
percentage of the time allotted to major parties. 4 ' A party is
deemed to be major only if it can indicate substantial support. Thus,
there is "Catch 22" embedded in the plan: a minor party cannot
receive a significant amount of time unless it can demonstrate "broad
support," and it cannot very easily attract such support without
television exposure to inform the masses of its existence and its pro-
gram.
Such objections diminish as the percentage of time allotted to mi-
nor party candidates increases beyond 50 percent of that granted to
148. Norman Thomas indicated his amenability toward a proportionate time
requirement in testimony before a Senate committee in 1952. Hearings on Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act Before the Subcomm. on
Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 82d
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 192-93 (1952).
Some minor parties would strenuously object to a proportionate time require-
ment, however. Among them is the Socialist Labor Party: "The Socialist Labor
Party of America declares that the real question comes down to this: Do the
American people have the right to hear all sides of the throbbing social, political,
and economic issues of the day? We hold that they do, and that, indeed, they
must hear all sides if they are to vote and act intelligently. The opponents of
section 315(a) [who support suspending or modifying it] say, in effect, that they
do not have this right. Their contentions amount to saying that the American
people have the right, or the need, to hear only the candidates of the major parties;
candidates, that is to say, who hold substantially identical views on all the vital
social, political, and economic questions of our age." Hearings on Equal Time Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 29, at 148 (1963).
149. Under one proposal, to receive equal time a party must have received
20 percent of the total votes cast in the preceding election or submit petitions
with signatures of persons totaling 8 percent of the vote cast in the preceding
election. Otherwise, a party and candidate only are able to qualify for the pro-
portionate time. A candidate will receive one-sixth of the amount of time
received by the major parties if his party polled between one and five percent of
the total votes cast in the previous election, or if petitions are submitted contain-
ing the names of one-half of one percent of the electorate. Derby, supra note
143, at 320.
Under another proposal, a party would have had to have received 10 percent of
the votes cast in the previous election to get equal time. Otherwise, it would re-
ceive one-twentieth of the time alloted to the major parties, unless it received votes
in the previous election, in which case its time would be computed by the per-
centage of the ratio of the minor party's votes to the votes received by the lowest
vote-getter of all major party candidates. Scott, Candidate Broadcast Time: A
Proposal for Section 315 of the Communications Act, 56 GEO. L. J. 1037, 1047
(1968).
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major party nominees. 150 Most proponents of proportionate time,
however, envision it as a plan to provide equal time for major party
candidates while purposefully granting only a fraction of that time
to other candidates.' 5'
7. Repeal Section 315, and require equal opportunities for candi-
dates from all parties meeting some minimal standard of signifi-
cance.
This proposal would provide for equal opportunities for all candi-
dates who can meet some minimal standard of significance. It dif-
fers from the existing Section 315 only in that it attempts to eliminate
equal opportunities for frivolous candidates. Setting a minimal
standard to also insure that no serious candidates-regardless of their
chances of winning-are denied an equal opportunity is a difficult
and delicate task. However, broad parameters can be envisioned.
For instance, third party presidential candidates such as Theodore
Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, Strom Thurmond, and George Wallace
would certainly qualify for equal opportunities. On the other hand,
a presidential candidate whose name is on the ballot only in Idaho,
and who is campaigning only in Pocatello, Idaho, would not qualify
for equal opportunities on nationwide television (though he might
qualify for equal opportunities within the State of Idaho).
Developing a standard to apply to all candidates in all situations
is much more demanding than examining extreme cases. The Fed-
eral Communications Commission has proposed one plan'11 which
would require that a candidate appear on the ballot in 34 states and
that the candidate's party have received at least two percent of the
popular vote in the last election, or, if the party was not entered in
150. One proposal would maintain an equal time requirement for the two major
parties, and provide a specific fixed percentage of time to all other candidates,
whatever their support or party. The percentage suggested was 50 percent. That
plan is better than those which provide minor candidates with only a fraction of
the time alloted to the major candidates, but the percentage is still somewhat low.
Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27 MD. L. REV.
221, 249 (1967).
151. It is not surprising that Senator Scott's proposal, note 149 supra, creates
an advantage for the major parties. The Senator is the minority leader in the U.S.
Senate and has an obvious interest in maintaining only a two-party system.
152. See Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 186 (testimony of FCC Chairman
Dean Burch). See also Geller, supra note 141, at 459.
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the last election, that a candidate file petitions bearing signatures
equal to at least one percent of the total vote cast in the preceding
election to receive equal opportunities. Presidential candidates
could qualify for equal opportunities on a state-by-state basis.'53
Candidates for offices other than President would receive equal op-
portunities if: (1) they have been nominated by political parties
whose candidates in the preceding general election received at least
two percent of the total popular vote for such offices; or (2) they
are supported by state validated petitions signed by eligible voters
numbering at least one percent of the vote cast for such offices in
the preceding general election.'
The FCC plan is generally a good one, but it is too restrictive. To
receive equal time on nationwide television, a candidate from a new
party running for President would have to qualify for a position on
the ballot in 34 states and, in addition, he would have to file petitions
bearing about 700,000 names.' 55 A more equitable plan would es-
tablish only one requisite for equal opportunties for a presidential
candidate: if a candidate's party received less than one percent of
the vote in the previous election, the candidate would have to secure
a place on the ballot in any number of states whose aggregate elec-
toral votes comprise a majority of the votes in the Electoral Col-
lege. This plan would insure that the candidate seriously intends to
offer his programs to a majority of the American people.' 56 There
should be no further requirement for petitions. All states require
that a candidate register prior to an election by some specified date
in order to secure a position on the ballot. Furthermore, in all gen-
eral elections all states require some minimal demonstration that a
candidacy is bona fide, such as a nomination by a recognized
party or submission of petitions signed by a specified number of vot-
ers.
1 5 7
153. See Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 186.
154. Id.
155. The number of names required is based on the 1968 vote total of
73,198,223. THE WORLD ALMANAC 703 (1971).
156. Since each state's electoral votes are computed on the basis of Senators
(two per state) and Representatives (the number based on the state's population),
the electoral vote is a reasonably accurate reflection of the state's voting age popu-
lation.
157. Derby, supra note 143, at 274.
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Candidates for offices other than President would automatically
receive equal opportunities if nominated by a party which received
more than one percent of the vote in the previous general election
for a particular office. If a candidate is a nominee of a party which
did not receive one percent of the vote in the last election for any
reason, the candidate should be required to submit petitions num-
bering at least one percent of the vote cast for such office in the
previous election. However, if a state requires a petition with at
least one percent of the total votes cast for the office in the previous
election to qualify for a place on the ballot, the petition requirement
for equal opportunities shall be deemed fulfilled. If a state requires
fewer than one percent of the votes in the previous election, a can-
didate need secure only the number of names necessary to total one
percent. 5 ' Presidential candidates could also qualify for equal
opportunities on a state-by-state basis by fulfilling the conditions
that a senatorial candidate in the state would have to meet.
This plan is only a slight modification of the existing Section 315,
and therefore it would include all candidates serious enough about
campaigning and presenting their views that they make an effort
to secure a place on the ballot. Yet the modest alteration of Section
315 would abolish equal opportunities for totally frivolous candi-
dates who can now demand equal opportunities.
C. THE COST OF POLITICAL TIME: SHOULD CANDIDATES
HAVE TO PAY?
During the Senate hearings on campaign reform legislation in 1971,
the following exchange occurred between former FCC Chairman
Newton Minow and Senate Subcommitee Chairman Pastore:
MR. MINOW. Mr. Chairman, I think you ought to take a serious look at what is
being done in other countries. The United States, believe it or not, is the only
country in the world where political candidates purchase time on television to take
their case to the people.
158. In Tennessee, for instance, a candidate can secure a place on the ballot by
securing the names of 25 voters on a petition. TENN. CODa ANN. § 2-1206
(Supp. 1964). To qualify for equal opportunities, candidates would be able to
apply those 25 names to the rest of the names he secures (which must total one
percent of the vote cast in the previous election). In Ohio, on the other hand, a
petition with seven percent of the electorate's names must be provided to get on the
ballot. Thus, a candidate on the ballot in Ohio would automatically satisfy the
requirements for equal opportunities. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.258 (Page
1960).
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THE CHAIRMAN. Say that a little louder.
MR. MINOW. The United States is the only country in the world where political
candidates purchase time to take their case to the electorate, and I think a very
serious study of the system that is used in Great Britain and in Canada and in Ger-
many and in Japan and in other countries is very much in order for this country,
because I think there is a lot to be learned. 1 59
Mr. Minow's observations do need to be said "a little louder," be-
cause the uniqueness of political candidates paying for time to uti-
lize airwaves owned by the people is generally not realized.
The approaches to political broadcasting vary in other countries.
While these approaches cannot be analyzed within the confines of
this paper, 0° it should be noted that in several respects the broad-
casting approaches in Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Japan
are similar:
There are two principal threads which run through all five countries. Time for
candidate presentations is provided to the candidate without charge. The burden is
assumed either by the network in question or by the government through subsidy.
Program production is a responsibility of the candidates or parties and except for
special debate or discussion features, not of the distributing network. The parties
have essentially the same freedom to operate that they have in the United States, but
they have avoided the enormous burden of television time costs which have become
so important a factor in American campaigning.'61
. Although there are vigorous opponents of plans to provide televi-
sion time to candidates at no cost, especially among incumbents, 62
the concept has won many adherents among political reformers. The
two principal advantages of free TV time are that: (1) the costs
of campaigns would be reduced substantially; and (2) all candi-
dates, regardless of their financial resources, could communicate with
voters over television.
Because the concept of free television time is so appealingly sim-
ple, a number of commentators have called for its implementation
in the following terms:
The best solution, as always, is the simplest and most direct. Prohibit all candi-
dates from buying any TV time. Give every candidate public TV time. That's it.
Clear, clean-cut, easily accomplished, and easily policed.
159. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 402.
160. For a discussion of the details of political broadcasting in other coun-
tries, see S. MICKELSON, supra note 5, at 134-38, 252-54.
161. id. at 131.
162. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), for instance, opposes plans to have the
federal government pay for candidates' broadcast time. Hearings on S. 382, supra
note 8, at 174 (testimony of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
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How much time? How long before the elections? For how many candidates, local
or national? Any FCC Commissioner or member of the prestigious Fair Campaign
Practices Committee should be able to work out an acceptable formula between
breakfast and the trip to the office. Or if they can't, some sixth grader could work
it out as surely, as fairly, and as instinctively as Solomon. 10 3
The problems involved in devising an "acceptable formula" for pro-
viding candidates with broadcast time at no cost cannot be resolved
that easily. But those problems are not insurmountable either.
The best known proposal is the Voter's Time concept advocated
by the Twentieth Century Fund Commission on Campaign Costs in
the Electronic Era. The Voter's Time plan would apply only to
presidential elections. Six one-half hour simultaneous broadcasts on
every radio station, television station, community antenna system
and educational station in the country would be provided for
candidates during the 35 days prior to an election. The time would
be paid for by the voters: the federal government would buy the
time at half-price from the broadcasters. The total cost would be
"less than sending a penny postcard to each voter in America."' 64
There are two broad requirements which must also be met in uti-
lizing Voter's Time: (1) the programs should be live, or involve a
substantial live appearance of the candidate; and (2) the format
should be designed "to promote rational political discussion, to il-
luminate campaign issues, and to give the audience insight into the
abilities and personal qualities of the candidates." '165 The time would
be allocated on a proportionate basis, with the Democratic and Re-
publican candidates' 66 receiving two or three times the amount of
time provided to minor party candidates. 16 7
163. Now Is the Time for All Good Men, AMERICA, July 11, 1970, at 6-7.
164. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 399 (testimony of Newton Minow).
165. Id. at 400.
166. In the legislation the parties are not referred to by name, but the lan-
guage is clearly a euphemism for Democrats and Republicans: ". . any political
party whose presidential candidacy finished first or second in popular votes in at
least two of the three most recent presidential elections." See, e.g., H.R. 14804,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
167. In H.R. 14804, the major parties would receive 6 one-half hour segments
of time, and parties receiving at least 12 percent of the vote in the previous
election would receive 2 one-half hour segments. Candidates with their names on
the ballots in 39 states would receive I one-half hour of time. H.R. 14804, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
In H.R. 5090, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), major parties would get 6 one-half
hour segments, candidates whose parties received at least 15 percent of the vote
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While the Voter's Time plan is unquestionably a desirable reform
of the existing system, it suffers from three shortcomings. First, free
time is provided for presidential candidates only.""8 The best plan
would provide free time for all federal candidates, for it is congress-
men and senators who need free time the most: their budgets are
much smaller than those of presidential contenders, and they are less
well-known than presidential contenders.
The principal objection to providing Voter's Time for all federal
candidates is that "television signals and political districts have no
correspondence at all."' 9 It is true that the contours of broadcast-
ing stations do not coincide with political boundaries, but that is not
sufficient reason for only permitting free time at the presidential
level. In many areas, a broadcasting station serves a major portion
of a congressional district, and candidates from that district could use
that station even though all of the viewers would not be constituents.
In major urban areas the number of congressional candidates re-
questing time on the city's stations would be large-but not prohib-
itive. Even in the New York City market-which contains 36 con-
gressional districts-Voter's Time could be provided for two candi-
dates for each House seat, for the Senate, and for the Presidency by
having each station air one-half hour of political broadcasting a night
during the 35 days prior to the election.170 All other markets, of
course, would require even less time allocated by individual stations.
Second, the Voter's Time plan unfairly discriminates against minor
party candidates, and, in so doing, deprives the public of an oppor-
tunity to fully evaluate minor party programs. Minor party candi-
dates get only a fraction of the free time allocated to the Democrats
and Republicans under the proposal, and yet minor party candidates
can least afford to buy time and are most in need of exposure. Some
argue that granting Voter's Time to candidates of minor parties in
amounts equal to that received by major parties will disrupt and per-
in the previous election would get 2 one-half hour segments, and a candidate
with his name on the ballot in 30 states would get 1 one-half hour segment.
168. This is the recommendation of the TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT.
However, some of the Voters Time bills introduced would provide Voters Time
for all federal candidates. See, e.g., H.R. 5090, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
169. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 403 (statement of Newton Minow).
170. See Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra note 12, at 82 (Table on Voters Time
Allocations in Major Metropolitan Areas).
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haps destroy the two party system. That is unlikely. But even if
such a prediction should prove to be true, it is not a justifiable ra-
tionale for limiting the free time granted to minor party candidates.
If the two party tradition can be maintained only by denying suffi-
cient exposure to other parties then its death can only be welcomed.
Nevertheless, a more probable scenario is that additional exposure
received by minor party candidates would more quickly infuse the
two major parties with new ideas and policies and have little effect,
if any, on the traditionally dismal chances for third party electoral
success.
Third, the Voter's Time proposal provides that the federal govern-
ment will pay for the free time, although stations will only be able
to charge half the price that a commercial advertiser would be
charged. While this proposal is politically realistic, 171 it is theoreti-
cally absurd. Since the public owns the airwaves, it should not be
forced to "buy" a minimal amount of time on those airwaves from
the broadcasters in order to provide the public service of presenting
political candidates on television prior to an election. Broadcasters
should pay the costs of political broadcasting time by simply provid-
ing it to candidates free of charge. Special provisions could be made
for that extremely small number of stations that would suffer a finan-
cial burden by providing free time; such stations, for instance, might
be permitted to deduct the costs and perhaps lost profits as well from
their taxable income. 172
171. The broadcasting industry is influential in Congress, and any plan to
require broadcasters to give time would be lobbied against-undoubtedly success-
fully-by the industry: "The industry's interest in political broadcasting is bol-
stered by resources that give it great weight in the debate on campaign finance.
Stations operate in every state and most Congressional Districts. Their managers
and owners are respected in their local communities. They also dispense favors
to elected officials. Many feature a senator or representative in a regular 'Report
from Washington.' Officeholders, in addition, frequently feel, rightly or wrongly,
that friendly relations with stations foster more favorable treatment on news
shows and aid in buying more favorable time slots for spot advertising during
campaigns. Broadcasters consequently have a friendly hearing in the halls of gov-
ernment." D. DUNN, supra note 34, at 69.
172. See Geller, supra note 141, at 451. The ability of stations to contribute
free time is difficult to determine with accuracy, since the FCC has refused to make
data on individual stations available to the public. Many stations, however, would
apparently be able to contribute time without undue hardship; in 1971 (the last year
for which overall data is available), 113 stations (out of 602 reporting) had pre-tax
profits of $1 million or more, and 36 stations had profits of more than $3 million.
Testimony of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, Federal Communications Corn-
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Thus, the Voter's Time plan should be altered to provide time for
all federal candidates, to provide equal amounts of time for all can-
didates meeting a minimal standard of significance, and to provide
that broadcasting stations absorb the costs of the time granted to
candidates. The simultaneity provision should be maintained, and
an aggregate number of hours should be provided to candidates"73
to divide into any combination of blocks of time of five minutes, 15
minutes, or 30 minutes. 1 4  Such a plan would benefit the candi-
dates and, most importantly, benefit the public.
D. TOTAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT
PAY FOR CAMPAIGNS?
The proposals to subsidize candidates' broadcast time have already
been discussed. Similar proposals have been advanced for the sub-
sidization of other means of campaign communication. It has been
suggested that the government pay for quantities of brochures for
political candidates, 175 and that political challengers be provided with
the free mailing privileges available to incumbent congressmen and
senators.' 76 Another suggestion is that the government provide funds
to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for the explicit purpose of
developing an alternative to present network coverage of political
campaigns.177 All of these suggestions have merit-and all ulti-
mately lead to a proposal for total government funding of political
campaigns. 178 The attractiveness of such a plan, of course, is that
mission, Hearings on Broadcast Renewal Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications and Power of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm.,
March 14, 1973, at 12 (release copy of testimony; hearings are not yet in print).
173. For instance, four hours for Presidential candidates, two for Senatorial
candidates, and one for House candidates.
174. The implementation of Voters Time would thus be an excellent means of
eliminating spots: the free time granted political candidates should not be available
in segments shorter than 5 minutes.
175. A. HEARD, supra note 1, at 439.
176. D. DUNN, supra note 34, at 146.
177. Id.
178. The suggestion that campaigns be totally subsidized by the government is
not new. Theodore Roosevelt is generally regarded as the first proponent of such
a plan; he urged such a system in 1907. A. HEARD, supra note 1, at 431.
Colorado enacted a statute in 1909 which banned private campaign contribu-
tions and gave each party 25 cents for each vote cast for its nominees for
governor in the preceding election. Colorado Session Laws, c. 141 [1909] (re-
pealed 1921). But in 1910, the state supreme court declared the law unconstitu-
tional without written opinion. People ex rel. State Chairman v. Galligan. Bot-
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it would totally eliminate the undue influence acquired by large
campaign donors while removing the financial barriers to candidacy
that now permit only the wealthy to run for election.
A partial step toward federal funding of campaigns was taken on
December 10, 1971, when the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act 179 was signed into law. This legislation-known as the tax
checkoff-permits a taxpayer to designate one dollar of his annual
income tax to be paid to a Presidential Election Campaign Fund.
Candidates from major and minor parties would be able to receive
payments from the Fund to conduct campaigns.'8  However, the law
is not applicable until the 1976 election, and perhaps not even then.
Payments into the Fund can be made only if money is appropriated
by Congress; if no money is appropriated before the 1976 elections,
no parties will receive payments. That is probably what will hap-
pen. President Nixon opposes the plan and has promised that it
will never be implemented. 8
Thus, new legislation will be required if partial or total federal fi-
nancing of campaigns is to be initiated. Many politicians, however,
sense that the public might not approve of federal financing. "The
big question," observed Senator Pastore, "is whether the taxpayers of
this country are willing to pay taxes to have every Tom, Dick and
Harry run for every office that is up for election."1 82
The taxpayers just might be willing. 8' According to one pro-
tomly, Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 BOST. U.L. REV. 331, 380
(1950).
There is, however, a working American precedent in Puerto Rico. Candidates re-
ceive as much as $150,000 in an election year from the government for campaign
expenditures. A. HEARD, supra note 1, at 433.
179. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9001-9013
(Supp., 1973).
180. Major party candidates, defined as candidates of parties which received
25 percent of the popular vote in the preceding election, would receive consider-
ably more than minor or new parties. Id. § 9004(a)(1-3).
181. See Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
182. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 440 (statement of Sen. Pastore).
183. ". . . [t]here is enormous public feeling and recent surveys by the
Roper and Gallup people show it, enormous distrust in the way in which we
presently finance campaigns." Id. at 620 (statement of Prof. David Adamany).
After a recent airing of "The Advocates" television program, viewers were
invited to send in their views on the issue in the form of votes. The audience
responded to the following question: 'Should the federal government subsidize all
campaigns for federal office?' Responses were received from 2,708 persons, 76
percent of whom answered 'Yes.' Id. at 440.
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ponent, the cost of funding a Presidential campaign and House and
Senate campaigns in both primaries and general elections would be
$93 million annually, or about 69 cents per person of 18 or over
in the United States.' For 69 cents a year, the taxpayer would re-
ceive the comfort that wealthy interests no longer have the oppor-
tunity to so directly influence legislators-and Presidents. The tend-
ency of government officials might be to act in the public inter-
est instead of for the monied interests. As Senator Philip Hart (D-
Mich.) exclaimed after listening to a federal financing proposal at
a Senate subcommittee hearing:
It is hard to understand what you have been saying, it is so foreign to our experi-
ence. But as I listen to you, it is precisely what we should do. Wouldn't it be
great if you didn't have to have a single dime identifiable from any living being?
It would be great for the incumbent, it would be great for the public. They might
be just as stupid, but they wouldn't suspect venality. Why not try it?185
Senator Hart's inclination to "try it" is not shared by his colleagues.
As Senator Pastore remarked at the same hearings, the idea "is 10
years ahead of its time, at least."'80
Since total federal funding does not appear to be politically feasi-
ble,'87 reform efforts might be directed toward achieving partial fed-
eral funding. For instance, the federal government could provide
matching grants to candidates, and, in so doing: (1) assist in mini-
mizing the amounts candidates raise; and (2) encourage the de-
velopment of small contributors. The federal government would
match each contribution of $50 or less, dollar-for-dollar, thereby pro-
viding candidates with incentives for raising funds from small con-
tributors.8 8  Such a plan would be a large step toward total financ-
ing of campaigns.
Total federal financing does pose problems. Will there be a dras-
tic increase in the number of candidates for political office, simply
because people would like to spend "free" money to advertise them-
selves?189  Will candidates be able to spend more than opponents
184. Id. at 442.
185. Id. at 375.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Such a plan would enable the parties to continue to use fund raising as a
means of developing interest in and support of the parties, and yet it would en-
courage specifically the small contributors.
189. The problem of sham candidates is one which is frequently alluded to
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through hidden items, such as "volunteers" who are actually being
paid by a large donor or corporation? These problems, however,
are not as severe as those posed by the continuation of a system of
campaign finance that places a premium on wealth and offers the
rich an opportunity to purchase influence. Such problems will be re-
solved if and when public indignation over the existing campaign fi-
ancing scandal transforms itself into pressure for change. Unfor-
tunately, as one reformer wisely observed: "As a practical mat-
ter, no major election reform is likely in the absence of a 100-mega-
ton campaign scandal."' 9 °  The recent Watergate revelations have
produced the 100-megaton scandal. Whether they will produce re-
form as well remains to be seen.
by opponents of free broadcast time or total subsidization of campaigns: "One
thing that worries me about free time is that every lawyer who doesn't have much
business on hand is going to be inclined to run for public office if he knows he
can get free television coverage. By the nature of the profession, they can't ad-
vertise. If we provide free time where they can get up on a podium and get free
television. [sic] Here, we are going to be attracting people to take demagog [sic]
positions, or anything, to gain attention." Hearings on H.R. 8627, supra note 12, at
165 (statement of Rep. James Collins).
190. Hearings on S. 382, supra note 8, at 456 (statement of Philip Stern).
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